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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION 
Problems of educational policy have recently received a 
great deal of attention by economists, and there is a clear 
trend toward the intensification of research in the economics 
of education.^  
Although much of the published research in this area 
concerns the educational sector in its entirety, e.g., for 
the U.S. as a whole, attempts have already been made to study 
the efficiency of the educational sector in more limited geo­
graphical areas. • This study is an attempt to shed some addi­
tional light, in the context of the latter framework," on two 
major problems of educational research and policy: 
1, What factors might determine the quality of high 
school education and how can that "quality" be 
measured? 
2. Are there economies of scale in high school oper­
ations? 
It is to be emphasized at the outset that our main pur­
pose is the building and testing of models which could be 
used by individuals or organizations concerned with educa­
tional policy. The specific results which are reported in 
A^n interesting insight may be obtained by noting that 
out of 19 Ph.D. candidates who will be available for positions 
in 1968 in the Economics Department of Iowa State University, 
3 will have written- their dissertations in the area of the 
economics of education. 
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Chapters 3, 4, and 5 can serve merely as an indication of how 
such analyses might be made. The data used in those chapters 
are for the years 1962-63, and the results cannot be taken as 
representative of the current [1968] situation in Iowa. 
In what follows, we shall treat the educational estab­
lishment (high schools, in bur study) as an industry, with 
each school district as a (multi- or single-plant) firm. Each 
firm produces a final product, and in the process it uses 
various types of fixed and variable inputs. Further, the in­
puts, (i =» 1, ..., n), are transformed into the final 
product, Y, by a production function, f, where, 
(1-1) y = f(3C^ Xn) 
To simplify the analysis it might be assumed that a production 
function of type 1-1 holds for each of the firms in the indus­
try, even though much variation may exist in the coefficients 
of each firm's function, (in other words, we may assume that 
for all firms f is homogeneous of degree 0 in the Xj,, but not 
that f is identical to all firms.) 
It must be emphatically noted that the final output (Y) 
of a high school is hot analogous to that of a soap factory. 
For not only does the student gain skills and knowledge which 
can, perhaps, be measured to an extent by appropriate tests; 
he also gains cultural, civic, and perhaps moral values which 
cannot so easily be measured. Therefore, the composite scores 
on the Iowa Tests of Educational Development (referred here­
after as ITED) used as a proxy for the final product in Chap­
ter 3 can at best measure only a part of the total product. 
The Data 
The empirical information used in the testing of models 
in this essay was, for the most part, compiled by the Iowa 
Department of Public Instruction. However, much of the Infor­
mation was thereafter processed and rearranged by Dr. Robert 
W. Thomas. In the original data set there were many more 
units of observation (i.e., high school districts) than have 
been used in the final set, since some of the variables under 
consideration were not reported for all districts. Neverthe­
less, we have retained the majority of the approved 4-year 
Iowa high schools (in existence in 1962-63) so that we may 
relate the results of the analysis to the Iowa high school 
"system." 
The Iowa Tests of Educational Development 
The test battery of the ITED is composed of nine differ­
ent examinations, of the objective type, "designed to provide 
a comprehensive and dependable description of the general 
educational development of the high school pupil" (21, p. 6). 
The examinations deal with basic social concepts, the natural 
sciences, quantitative analysis, reading, expression, vocab­
ulary, and other areas. While the tests are "intended for 
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administration in an annual testing program to all pupils in 
grades 9 through 12," they may actually be administered only 
once every two years (e.g., in the 9th and 11th grades or in 
the 10th and 12th grades). An important feature of the ITED 
is that "the test results for the various ye^ s [are] di­
rectly comparable to one another, " thus enablijng us to make 
progress studies (21, p. 8), 
The test results are given in a number of ways. First, 
each student receives a profile of the results on the nine 
tests, including a composite score which is a weighted aver­
age of the results on the first eight tests (thus excluding 
the test entitled Use of Sources of Information). Also, 
profiles and composite scores are given for each class, and, 
finally, similar results are reported for the school. In 
our study; we shall concentrate only upon the composite score 
for the school as a whole—for a given grade—since this is 
the only test result which was made available to us. 
It is to be noted that the 12th grade score, for example, 
"must be regarded as a result of a lifetime of educational 
experiences, both in arid out of school.... For example, a 
school's 10th grade performance on Test 3 is much more depen­
dent upon the language habits the pupils developed in grades 
1 to 8 than upon instruction received since they entered high 
school. The 11th and 12th grade performance on this test is 
more appreciably influenced by high school instruction in 
language, but all the averages may be more dependent on what 
happened to the students before they entered than since they 
entered high school."^  
Since we are interested in the measurement of high • 
school quality—and not that of the total educational system— 
a measure of gain must be developed: 
To evaluate the high school program alone, as 
distinct from the elementary and junior high school 
programs, one would need to know how much the pupils 
Improved while they were in high school. To measure 
the effectiveness of the high school program as such, 
one should determine the gain'in test performance 
for a typical class of students from the' time of 
entrance to high school to the time of graduation (28, 
p. 21). 
Consequently, the most reasonable measure of academic gain 
would be the difference between, say, the 12th grade composite 
score and the 10th grade score, for some "representative" 
class. 
Such a longitudinal comparison,•which is the best we 
can provide at present, is still full of pitfalls. First, 
"changes in the composition of a class through student trans­
fers or school reorganization can have a marked effect on 
class averages." Second, "gains revealed by these compari­
sons are dependent upon many other factors besides effective­
ness of instruction. Particularly important are; 
1. The level of intelligence or of scholastic aptitude 
for the group. 
S^ee (28, p. 20). Test 3 is entitled. Correctness and 
Appropriateness of Expression, 
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2, The nature of the group's out-of-school environment 
and educational opportunities. 
3. The extent to which the students are motivated to 
do their best on the tests at each of the two test­
ings. 
The effects of all possible factors should be investigated 
before judgments are made about the curriculum or the in­
structional program" (28, p. 22). In addition, other factors 
may influence the performance on these tests, such as: 
a. On the part of the pupil: Motivation, temporary 
and permanent health, home environment, previous 
school experiences (especially,if he is a transfer 
student). 
b. On the part of the school: Curriculum, textbooks 
used, teaching materials supplied, general adequacy 
of school plant and equipment, type and extent of 
supervision, administrative policies, general 
harmony within school staff. 
c. On the part of the community; Type (industrial or 
rural), population (foreign or native, heteroge­
neous or homogeneous), general level of culture, 
interest in educational matters, financial support 
of schools, cooperativeness toward school admin­
istration (21, p. 46). 
Finally, if the undesirable practice of "coaching pupils 
specifically on items which the teacher thinks or knows will 
occur in the tests" takes place, then the tests' "validity 
as measures of general achievement and ability is gone (21, 
p. 59). 
Chapter 2 surveys much of the literature on the econom­
ics of education, particularly the journal articles that were 
written in the last ten years. Of course, as many new publi-
.cations appear constantly, and in growing numbers, the review 
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does not cover those publications that have appeared since 
summer 1967. Nor do we pretend it to be exhaustive. In addi 
tion, interesting material included in the books by Schultz 
- (35) and Becker (3) has been touched upon only when it per­
tained directly to the discussion at hand. 
Next, Chapter 3 summarizes the arguments and empirical 
results that involve the use of the ITED scores, where the 
latter are hypothesized as being the accepted measure of out­
put, or school quality. In the following chapter, the impli­
cations of possible economies of scale in high school opera­
tions—after an allowance is made for different levels of 
quality among schools—are studied both theoretically and 
empirically. 
Last, Chapter 5 provides a new framework for the exami­
nation of high school quality. Given that the ITED scores 
do not provide us with an unequivocal measure of school 
quality, we choose, on a priori grounds, those factors which 
we believe affect quality. Further, these factors are 
• closely scrutinized. On the basis of these "quality" factors 
a new "quality index" is formulated. 
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CHAPTER TWO. A REVIEW OP THE LITERATURE 
To the educator, to the school administrator, and to 
many laymen, the intrusion of economic analysis into the realm 
of education may seem unwarranted. In particular, the edu­
cator fears the examination by the economist of what 0. E. 
Beeby (5) calls "the classroom conception of quality." That 
is, while the economist is acknowledged the right to examine 
the aspects of education "outside the classroom and into the 
market-place, where the quality of education is measured by 
its productivity," no such right is bestowed upon him where 
such items as the performance of students in the "three R's" 
or "the acquisition of a given range of facts about history, 
geography, hygiene and the like" are concerned (5, pp. 10-13). 
Moreover, since education has so many diverse aspects, such 
as cultural, sociological, psychological, spiritual and moral 
considerations, endeavors by economists to shed some light 
on educational policy are regarded with suspicion. Neverthe­
less, economists have recently embarked upon a wide range of 
studies dealing with educational systems. 
It will be useful to classify the available literature 
into three categories. The first will encompass studies 
which relate to the economic value of education—to benefits, 
costs, rates of return and the like. The second, an emerging 
topic, includes studies relating to the manpower-planning 
approach to the study of educational planning. The third 
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Includes studies of the measurement of educational quality 
and the uses of such measurements. 
The Economic Value of Education 
It had been evident even to the classical economists 
that a full notion of capital must Include human capital. 
As Klker (24) points out, the value of humans was included 
in the definition of capital by such great economists as Sir 
William Petty, Adam Smith, Say, Senior, List, von Thunen, 
Walras and Pisher. Their main interest was in calculating 
the value of humans for the following purposes (24, p. 48l): 
1. To demonstrate the power of a nation. 
2. To determine the economic effects of education, 
health investment and migration. 
3. To propose tax schemes believed to be more equitable 
than existing ones. 
4. To determine the total cost of war. 
5. To awaken the public to the need for life and 
health conservation and the significance of the 
economic life of an individual to his family and 
country; and 
6. To aid courts and compensation boards in making fair 
decisions in cases dealing with compensation for 
personal injury and death. 
Two main approaches were used to calculate the value of 
humans. The first is called the cost of production approach, 
while the second is the capitalized value approach. Define 
as the total cost of producing a human being (neglecting 
interest, depreciation and maintenance) through age x. Also, 
10 
let CQ denote costs Incurred up to the point of birth, k the 
annual percentage increase in cost, then Ernst Engel's formula 
iSî^  
(2-1) « Cg [1 + X + k (x (x + 1) / 2) ] 
Theodore Wittstein formulated two additional methods of 
computing the cost of producing humans. His first formula 
follows the cost of production approach, while the second is 
a mixture of the former approach and the capitalized value 
one; 
L 
(2-2) « a Ro'^ r^  -
n 
(2-3) 0„ = X p"-" - aR„ 
where "a is the annual consumption expenditures including 
education for an average German male in a particular occupa­
tion, r = (1 + i), where i is the market interest rate; p = 
l/r; is the number of men living at age n in a life table; 
is the value of age n of a 1-thaler annuity (for a given 
r and purchased at birth); X is the value of the future out­
put of an average man in a particular occupation; N is the 
age at which this man enters the labor force (24, p. 483). 
The cost of production approach has been attacked on 
S^ee the Appendix for the derivation of 2-1. 
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many grounds. Klker objects to It because, in his view, there 
is no "simple and necessary relationship between the cost of 
producing an item and its economic value." Whether or not 
we agree with Kiker on this point, it seems that modern 
writers prefer the capitalized value approach. And while the 
1 
following formulas were advanced by Dublin and Lotka in 1930, 
these were originated by William Parr (though in a slightly 
different form) as early as 18535 
(a-4) V, = I (yA - =x) 
(2-5) •= r I fx (yA - °%) 1 
•3» " J 
(2-6) 0^  =  ^[ Jo 
where "V^  is the value of the individual at birth; v^  = (l + 
i)"% is the present value of $1.00 due x years later; is 
the probability at birth of an individual living to age x; 
y^  is yearly earnings per individual from age x to x + 1...; 
c^  is the cost of living for an individual from age x to x + 
1." Also, is the value of the individual at age a. Final­
ly, is the cost of producing an individual up to age a. 
Ipor bibliography on this and other sources, see Kiker 
(24, pp. 497-498). 
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while is the proportion of individuals employed from age 
X to age X + 1 (24, p. 484). 
We shall concentrate our efforts in the remainder of 
this section on the refinements of the formulas presented 
above, as well as the discussion of the variables involved. 
Problems in estimation 
Even if we can devise a perfect.technique for the eval­
uation of human capital, it will be of no avail If appropri­
ate data do not exist. And while data concerning physical 
capital abound, few are available for the human counterpart. 
In addition, given the available data, we are still con­
fronted with a store of problems. In the first place, the 
• nature of the data rarely fits exactly the purpose of the 
study. For example, the Census of Population contains some 
data on personal incomes cross-classified according to edu­
cational levels of the income recipients. Yet these are only 
cross-sectional data, and we would like to have longitudinal 
data showing the effects of different educational inputs 
upon incomes of members of the same cohort (e.g., all persons 
born in a given one-year or five-year period). Furthermore 
in such census reports, no account is taken of the ability 
and other background of the individuals in each income or 
educational category. 
As most writers attempt to measure the value of an 
incremental education unit, for example, the value of college 
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education, we need marginal income figures. However, Census 
and other data give us merely the mean and/or median Income 
for the group. One obvious question is, therefore. Which of 
the two (mean or median) is most appropriate for our pur­
poses? The answer depends on whether the mean is larger (or 
smaller) than the median and whether the average rate of 
return exceeds (or is smaller than) the marginal rate of 
return. Renshaw argues that the marginal rate of return is 
smaller than the average rate of return because of diminish­
ing returns "and as a consequence of the likelihood that any-
general Increase in educational attainment will be accompanied 
by a decrease in the average level of ability" (32, p. 322). 
Further, Renshaw contends that "median [income] differentials 
are smaller than mean differentials owing to the skewness in 
the distribution of income."^  Hence, Renshaw argues, it 
appears that the median is more appropriate. Moreover, there 
are some practical considerations. "In the first place, 
census data are typically reported that way. Since the 
Census is the only comprehensive source of income data classi­
fied by education, one is almost forced to start with medi­
ans. Another reason is that the most recent Census definition 
of income includes property income as well as wage and salary 
income. Median income differentials are likely to be less 
S^ee Renshaw (32, p. 322) and Becker (3, PP. 136 ff.). 
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biased because of property income than are means" (32, p. 
322). Concurring with Renshaw on this issue is D. S. Bridg-
man. In his view, the method which uses the median "eliminates 
the greater than proportional weight given in calculating 
means to a relatively limited number of quite large Incomes" 
(9, p. 181). 
On the other hand, it may be argued that dynamic changes 
"might act to maintain a constant marginal rate of return 
over time"'in which case the mean is a more accurate repre­
sentation of the marginal rate of return (32, p. 322). In 
addition, should we feel that the rates of return obtained 
by using the median are too low (the reasons for which will 
be explored later), the mean may be the preferred statistic. 
Furthermore, while recent Census data did include prop­
erty income, many sources of income, other than wages and 
salaries, have not been included. An example is dividend-
income. 
Consumption and investment in education 
Professor Theodore W. Schultz (35) was one of the first 
to recognize that education involves not only investment in 
the human agent but also a certain amount of consumption. 
Thus, a student undertaking college education receives (l) a 
potentially higher income in the future, a result of his 
investment, and (2) an immediate (as well as future) reward 
in the satisfaction that he derives from his education. In­
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asmuch as the student acquires new tastes, the added satis­
faction from utilizing these in the future constitutes in­
vestment for future consumption. The point is that most 
studies which have attempted to calculate the returns to 
education have had to ignore the consumption element, re­
gardless of how important it may be. 
Moreover, the consumption element discussed above 
should properly Include a host of what are commonly called 
third-party effects, external economies (and diseconomies) 
or simply externalities. These include the satisfaction 
and benefits incurred by the individual's family and associ­
ates, his future employers, his neighbors, and the society 
as a whole. Burton A. Weisbrod (39) goes even farther than 
that. He shows that the investment component, as well, is 
grossly underestimated by the conventional methods (to be 
discussed shortly). We shall defer the discussion of these 
matters for a later stage. 
Rates of return 
It will be useful at this point to analyze the ways in 
which rates of return to education, have been obtained in the 
literature. One such attempt was made by Becker (4), who 
was interested in the investment (or underinvestment) in 
college education. The technique used was to take Census 
income data classified by education, adjust for ability, 
race, unemployment and mortality. The costs of acquiring 
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the education are subtracted from income. The costs of edu­
cation are composed of foregone earnings, direct costs to 
the student (tuition, fees, books, etc.), or if we are inter­
ested in the social, rather than the private, cost, the dif­
ference between the total cost of providing the student with 
all the necessary facilities and his direct tuition costs. 
The remaining figure is, thus, the net revenue (income over 
cost) to the student. To get a rate of return, we must dis­
count the stream of net revenue by some interest rate to 
arrive at a present value figure. Becker used this scheme 
to arrive at a rate of approximately 9 per cent for 1940 and 
1950 Census data (including urban-whites only). In a later 
publication, the results were revised: 14.5 per cent for 
1940, and 13 per cent for 195O (5, p. 78). But the methods 
used in this latter study were more refined, incorporating 
into the analysis such factors as the secular rate of growth 
in earnings and tax rates which have not been considered 
previously. 
Similar methods have been usied by others to calculate 
various rates of return. Schultz (36), for example, gives 
an estimate of l4.3 per cent as the rate of return on four 
years of high school in the U.S. as of 1939, For 1958 he 
reports the following rates; elementary, 35 per cent; high 
school, 10 per cent; and college, 11 per cent. One more set 
of estimates is given by Lee Hansen (17). He shows that for 
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males, in 194$, the marginal rate of return rises rapidly 
from the completion of the first 2 years to the completion 
of the 7th and 8th year of schooling, from a rate of about 
9 to 29 per cent. The marginal rate of return then declines " 
for high school and collegej the 11th and 12th year of 
schooling show a return of nearly l4 per cent and the 15th 
and l6th year a strong 15 per cent. And Renshaw reports the 
following: 
In the Thirty-Eighth Annual Report of the National 
Bureau, Becker presents some preliminary estimates of 
the rate of return earned on income Invested in a 
college education in 1940. "The rate of return was 
about 12 per cent on income invested by society, while 
it was over l4 per cent on that invested by the indi­
viduals and their families." In an unpublished paper, 
Telser arrives at about the same conclusions. • "The 
internal rate of return of a college education is 
about 15 per cent" (32, pp. 318-19). 
Using time-series data, Renshaw obtained similar figures on 
"the-average productivity of education." 
It must be emphasized once again that these rates are 
direct rates of return inasmuch as they do not consider 
external effects (whether positive or negative). Further, 
it is far from clear that the costs used in the computation 
of net income are indeed the "correct" costs. We shall 
examine both of the above qualifications in turn.. 
External or neighborhood effects 
While Becker, in his I96O article, had already paid lip 
service to the existence of "external economic and military 
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effects," which, as he then contended, are brought about by 
a select group of students whose major fields are in the 
natural sciences—and only for those in high academic ranks-
he failed, at that stage, to realize the importance of the 
consumption element as well as the various external effects. 
This failure was brought to light by Weisbrod (39) who lists 
these external effects in an almost exhaustive manner. 
One argument is used in almost any introductory public 
finance textbook to justify the interference of government 
in the market, namely, the fact that the education of one's 
children will spill-over some benefits on his neighbors, his 
% 
ovm family, and the community as a whole. In the first 
place, an educated person's mode of behavior is likely to be 
better in terms of the norms of the society than that of the 
uneducated person. Also, such a person is more likely to 
participate in civic activities. The result may be a con­
siderably more pleasant neighborhood; Weisbrod suggests 
that the value of such benefits may be gauged by "studying 
voting behavior on school issues among non-parents." 
Second, the student's family stands to gain as well. 
When we measure the rate of return to elementary and high 
school education, we must note that mothers are free to go 
to work, if they so wish. One can measure the extra value 
to the mothers of this opportunity by calculating the amount 
S^ee, for example, Buchanan (10, pp. 422-423). 
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that mothers would hâve to pay baby-sitters. Since many 
mothers would probably not go to work at all if they had to 
take care of their children, this estimate is likely to be 
biased downward. In any event, Weisbrod demonstrates that 
this gain is equivalent to about 25 per cent of elementary 
school costs. 
Third, there are substantial gains to society, whether 
the employers and colleagues of the subject, the taxpayer, or 
society at large. Obviously, there are employment-related 
benefits. First, the employer stands to gain the more edu­
cation his employees obtain. Further, the other employees, 
with whom the former student will associate, tend to gain, 
as v/ell, the more education he obtains: the productivity of 
one employee .depends on that of the,others. So everyone has 
"a financial interest in the education of his fellow worker." 
As suggested above, the taxpayer benefits in the form 
of lower law enforcement costs (perhaps also lower insurance 
rates, etc.), as we expect less crime to originate from the 
more educated citizenry. It would be an interesting exercise 
to test the above hypothesis on the basis of police records. 
Finally, as Weisbrod suggests, society in general stands 
to gain from more education. For example, the more people 
obtain literacy, the more the demand for books, checking 
accounts, etc. Then mass production and distribution tech­
niques may be applied so that the price of the above may be 
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quite low. Also, the more people are engaged in research, 
the more the benefits to society in the form of inventions 
and innovations for which the inventor cannot generally col­
lect all the fruits of his labor. 
Other direct benefits 
In addition to the neglect of external effects in the 
analysis of educational returns, there are a number of direct 
returns which have not been considered. We shall discuss the 
options or opportunities that education opens to the student. 
One such option, what Weisbrod calls "financial option," 
underlies the fact that schooling gives the student the 
opportunity to undertake more schooling (and, according to 
Mincer (30), more on-the-job training as well). He therefore 
proposes the following formula for measuring the rate of re­
turn to education; 
z C 
(2-7) Rj = R. + 2 (Rj - R) Q— • 
 ^ J a=k  ^  ^
* 
where R. is the rate of return at year J computed by the 
usual method (i.e., "it is the difference between the present 
value of expected future earnings of a person who has attain­
ed, but not exceeded, level j, and the present value of ex­
pected future earnings of a person without education j"). R 
is the alternative rate of return on "the next best invest­
ment opportunity;" is the marginal social cost of obtain­
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ing the incremental education a, and is the probability 
that a person with educational level j will undertake level 
a. Using the data supplied by Schultz (34), Weisbrod demon­
strates that, by using a discount rate of 5 per cent (i.e., 
R = 5^ }, the rate, of return (Rj) for high school education 
increases by at least 2.8 per cent, while that of elementary 
education increases by 12.3 per cent! 
The second class of options is Weisbrod's "non-financial 
options." For instance, a college professor has many non-
financial advantages. The monetary value of such options 
can be measured by the difference between the wages and 
salaries that he could have earned in alternative employments 
and that which he actually earns. Another example is what 
Weisbrod has called the "hedging option." That is, education 
particularly a general one, enables a person to change jobs 
more easily. Moreover, by acquiring knowledge, an individual 
is able to perform a number of services himself that would 
have otherwise been performed in the market (this is Weisbrod 
"non-market option"). An example of this is the filing of 
income-tax returns. Weisbrod claims that the savings to the 
total populace by filing their own tax-returns is about 0.8 
per cent of total elementary school costs. Other examples 
are typewriting and driving. 
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Intergeneratlon effects 
Not only do the analyses of the rates of return to edu­
cation neglect a host of direct and indirect returns to the 
individual and his contemporaries, they also fail to take 
into account alleged intergeneration effects (38). It has 
been shorn that a strong correlation exists between the edu­
cational level of the parents and the likelihood that their 
children will-embark on additional educational training as 
well. Therefore, if the children's income will be enhanced 
by their extra education, and if this extra education was ob­
tained because the parents decided to spend more on education, 
it follows that part of the children's return is (indirectly) 
attributed to the parental educational expenditure. In sum, 
if we confine ourselves to the head of the family only, the 
head's rate of return on education is likely to be much larger 
than previously envisaged. 
Swift and Weisbrod (38) propose the following empirical 
model. Let Cy denote "the cost of each of the k years of 
the head's education," R "the annual return on the next most 
profitable investment," and R* "the gross return on the sec­
ond generation investment under consideration." Then we want 
to solve for r—the rate of return on "the additional incen­
tive which the parent's schooling apparently provided to the 
child"—in Equation 2-8: 
.(a-8) . jr . Wp 
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where a is the age at which the head terminated his education, 
and n is the age at which the child began to work. Further, 
a number of assumptions are made. First, it ia assumed that 
the head did not become a parent until he was 25 years old. 
Second, we make specific assumptions as to the value of ÏÏ. 
In addition, many other assumptions have been made in the 
process, so that the authors warn us that the results "should 
be regarded as tentative at best." In any event, if we accept 
the model and the assumptions, it appears that at least the 
cost of the parents' high school education was paid back by 
the intergeneration effect. Although this conclusion does 
not hold true for all incremental education levels chosen by 
the parents, at least part of the parent's cost of any in­
cremental education unit was paid back to the children.^  
Moreover, it is the concept, rather than the particular esti­
mates, that is of significance; the latter can and should be 
improved at a later date. 
School costs and earnings foregone 
So far we have used the term "cost of education" without 
much elaboration. However, it is far from obvious what to 
include in this term and how to include it. Perhaps the 
most straightforward portion of the costs of schooling is 
the direct cost (to the individual or to society). This will 
T^he specific results are reported in (38, Table 2, 
p. 647). 
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include expenditures on fees, books, and the like. Also, for 
the measurement of the social cost we can include in this 
category most of the expenditures by the school under ques­
tion. However, in the latter case, school expenditures do 
.not always indicate the exact cost of schooling. First, ex­
penditures may include such items as building improvement, or 
other capital outlays, which do not necessarily represent 
school costs for any particular year. Second, public school 
budgets do not include costs incurred by the students or 
their families. For example, a student may be required to 
buy his oivn school supplies (paper, pencils, and miscellaneous 
equipment). Or his family may be required to provide him with 
transportation to and from school. Further, a more rigorous 
analysis should not neglect the fact that public schools (and 
other educational institutions) are exempt from tax payments. 
This fact implies that society must face an additional im­
plicit cost in its educational enterprise, one that should 
properly have been added to other explicit school costs. 
More important yet is the major portion of school costs— 
earnings foregone. To illustrate the importance of these 
costs, I reproduce the figures given by Schultz in Table 2-1 
below for four countries. The method used by Schultz to 
arrive at the U.S. figures assumes that students forego 40 
weeks of earnings annually. Their weekly foregone income is 
measured by the corresponding income figures for workers in 
Table 2-1. School costs, earnings foregone, and total costs of schooling per 
student per year in the United States, Israeli Mexico and Venezuela 
I Earnings foregone 
School Earnings as per cent of 
costs foregone Total total cost 
United States, 1956 (dollars) 
8 years elementary 
4 years high school 
4 years college 
Israel, 1957-58 (Israeli pounds) 
8 years elementary 
4 years high school 
3 years higher education 
Mexico, 1957 (pesos) 
6 years primary 
6 years secondary 
3 years university 
Venezuela, 1957-58 (bolivars) 
6 years primary 
5 years secondary 
4 years university 
280 0 280 0 
568 852 1,420 60 
1,353 1,947 3,300 59 
l40 30 170 18 
670 1,000 1,670 .60 
2,481 2,930 5,411 54 
360 O 360 O 
1,794 2,833 4,627 61 
2,426 3,280 5,706 57 
400 0 400 - 0 
1,200 5,000 6,200 81 
5,000 12,000 17,000 71 
A^dapted from Theodore W. Schultz (35, Table 1, p. 29). 
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a comparable age group. Multiplying the weekly wage by 40 
we get the total annual earnings foregone. Schultz concludes 
that high school students forego the equivalent of about 11 
weeks and college and university students about 25 weeks of 
average manufacturing earnings. Compared to total school 
costs, high school foregone earnings were about 73 per cent 
in 1900 and 60 per cent in 1956. College and university fore­
gone earnings were about 59 per cent of total costs in 1956. 
No earnings foregone were assigned to elementary students, 
even though there are strong indications that in 19OO or 
thereabout they were quite substantial (one third of the 
population was on farms). 
Internal rate of return or present value 
The presentation of rates of return to education pre­
supposed the policy implications embodied in these rates. 
Thus, the "internal rate of return rule" suggests that we 
compare the rate of return (as explained above) to, say, 
college education to the rate of return earned on the best 
alternative investment. Then, if the latter exceeds the 
former, it would not be worthwhile to undertake (or support) 
the investment in college education—and vice versa. In a 
path-breaking article. Jack Hirshleifer (20) shows that "the 
contention of those who reject the internal rate of return 
S^ee Schultz (34). 
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as an investment criterion" are on the whole Justified. 
Further, while the present value rule "is at best only a 
partial indicator of optimal investments and, in fact, under 
some conditions, gives an incorrect result," Hirshleifer's 
study "provides some support for the use of the present-
value rule" (20, p. 329). The present-value rule simply 
states that we should compute the present value of all alter­
native investment projects, and choose that which has the 
highest present value. 
There are also some practical reasons for the use of 
the latter rule. As Wilkinson observes, it is easier "to 
calculate the present value of each project than it is to 
subtract one income stream from another and compute rates of 
return for every possible comparison of projects" (43). How­
ever, this observation makes sense only when we attempt to 
compare the returns to one occupational group, say, with 
those of another. But in such studies as reported above, 
the internal rate of return rule is the simpler technique. 
Also, under certain conditions, the two rules yield identical 
results (20, p. 333). 
International comparisons 
So far we have limited ourselves to American education. 
Many data are also available on other countries, but here 
we shall report just a few observations; 
Bruce Wilkinson'has studied some aspects of human capital 
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in Canada. A very interesting question is whether people 
would change jobs if the return in alternative employments 
were greater. He thus compared the present value (to be 
denoted henceforth p.v.) of income for different levels of 
education for selected occupations. Using discount rates 
of 3, 8 and 10 per cent, he found that, in general, incre­
ments in "education result in p.v. increments as well—except 
for two years of college at 8 and 10 per cent. However, for 
different occupations there are different results; For 
example, for some occupations, such as typesetters and drafts­
men, four years of high school may not be worthwhile—even if 
the discount rate .were only 5 per cent. And to illustrate 
the way in which marginal differences in p.v. cause mobility 
between occupations, he presents his study of "changes in 
discounted returns to teachers and engineers in relation to 
changes in college enrollment." Thus, between 195? and 1961 
the following observations were made: 
•a. teachers' p.v. increased between 17 and 20 per cent; 
b. enrollment in education increased 133 per cent; 
c. engineers' p.v. increased between 4 and 5 per cent; 
d. enrollment in engineering increased by 3.8 per cent. 
A partial explanation of (a) and (b), according to Wilkinson, 
includes the following: 
1. "The increasing numbers of women attending univer­
sity frequently favor education;" 
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2. "teacher training has been shifted from teachers' 
colleges to the university campus and such 
colleges have been incorporated in education 
faculties;" and 
3, "the increasing number of students attending univer­
sity may choose education '^ cause it is easier to 
finance than engineering: a person can take on two 
years of training, then commence teaching and ob­
tain the balance of his university education at 
summer schoox or by correspondence courses designed 
for this purpose." 
Nonetheless, there is still a significant relationship between 
results (a) and (b) pointing to the fact that some tendency 
exists to move to (or to choose) one occupation rather than 
another when changes in the present value of earnings occur. 
Another study, this time on India, was undertaken by 
V. N. Kothari (26). The purpose of the study was to "measure 
the magnitude of resources used up by education" in India. 
Some of the peculiar features of the Indian economic and edu­
cational system, had to be taken into account in estimating 
some of the costs incurred by pupils in India. For example, 
private tutoring is quite important. Kothari presents two 
methods for the estimation of earnings foregone. In both 
cases, assumptions are made with respect to the "earning 
equivalents" that students could potentially obtain according 
to their age, sex and educational level. For example, high 
school students, aged 15 and above, in rural and urban areas 
are assumed to have the earning capacity of a primary school 
teacher. The two methods differ in that the so-called "lower" 
estimate (of earnings foregone) excludes, altogether potential 
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earnings by primary school pupils, reduces the number of 
potentially economically active female students in general 
education to 25 per cent (50 per cent in the "upper" esti­
mate), and deflates the obtained (lower) estimate by 25 per 
cent to account for unemployment (instead of 10 per cent in. 
the "upper" estimate). 
Total educational costs in India reflect explicit and • 
implicit (earnings foregone, in particular) costs. Since 
we have two estimates of earnings foregone, there will be 
two corresponding estimates for total educational costs. 
Further, in the "lower" estimate (of total costs) the esti­
mated expenditures on private tuition is reduced by half. 
Nevertheless, the major difference between the upper and 
lower estimates of total educational costs in India is 
attributable to the differences in the estimation of earn­
ings foregone. 
Although the methods used to arrive at total cost fig­
ures are not equivalent to those used by Schultz and others 
in the preparation of the American data, some useful compari­
sons emerge; 
1. Earnings foregone are a very important component of 
total resource costs in Indian education—between 45 and 55 
per cent of total costs. 
2. Total educational costs as a proportion of NNP in­
creased from 3.6 per cent in 1950-5.1 to 6.5 per cent in 1959-
60. 
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3. Total educational cost as a proportion of total net 
investment = .60 for the entire period. That is, educational 
and physical capitals (in India) have been increasing at 
about the same rate. 
4. l^ hile, according to Schultz (34), total educational 
expenditures in the U.S. were about 34 per cent as large as 
total gross investment in physical capital in the U.S., total 
costs of education in India were between 27 per cent and 35 
per cent (for the lower and upper estimates, respectively) 
of gross investment in India, 
5. Further, while, cost of schooling per pupil in India 
is far less than that in the U.S., the ratio of per pupil 
cost to per capita national income is much lower in the U.S. 
than it is in India. In other wordsj the burden of the edu­
cational enterprise is greater in India than it is in the 
U.S. 
6. Finally, "the higher stages of education are rela­
tively costlier in India than in the U.S.—whether measured 
in terms of cost of primary education or measured in terms 
of per capita income." 
Another study examines the profitability of education 
in Israel (25). The results of Mrs. Klinov-Malul's investi­
gation show that for the most part only primary education is 
profitable, both to the individual and to the State. Second­
ary education is not, for two reasons. First, secondary 
school fees are high (assuming the parent pays full fees)— 
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higher even than university tuition fees. Second, In Israel's 
egalitarian society high school graduates do not earn much 
more than primary school graduates. And as far as college 
and university education Is concerned, it is only slightly 
more profitable to the individual, whereas it entails some 
loss to society—the equation varying according to occupations. 
Of the four occupations studied, lavjyers make no profit, engi­
neers and accountants do make profit, while medicine brings 
no profit to the individual and a substantial loss to society 
(it must be remembered that external and other benefits are 
not Included, whereas most costs are). 
Finally, studies by Blaug and others on Great Britain 
are revealing, but a completely independent survey must be 
undertaken in order to cover such a wide field.^  
The stock of human capital 
In this final part of this section we want to analyze 
the total value in the economy of human capital, as well as 
the average value of individuals of given age and educational 
levels. Such attempts have been made by several authors. 
Welsbrod, for example, measured the average value of a human 
being in the United States, as well as the total stock of 
human capital (40). If, indeed, we could have a measure of 
a person's value, given his age, on the basis of some "average" 
figure, it would be of great significance in settling court 
Ipor some references, see (12). 
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cases arising from accidental (or otherwise) death or injury, y 
in determining the optimal amount of life insurance to be 
taken each year, and in the formulation of immigration 
policies—to mention but a few applications. Weisbrod's 
formulation is thus: 
(2-9) . V, - f [ Y, ?: ] 
n=a • \  ^
where V„ « present value of expected future earnings; Y =» 
ot n 
value of productivity of a person at age n; and = proba­
bility that a person of age a being alive at age n. 
Weisbrod uses this formula with two different values for 
r (the rate of discount), 4 and 10 per cent. Incorporating 
earning figures of the Census Bureau, he arrives at income-
age profiles with the following conclusions; 
1. V is positive even for ages 0-4. This implies 
that excess of income over consumption is much higher in 
subsequent years than excess'of consumption over Income in 
early years. Now, is gross productivity, which is taken 
to be the person's income. A net productivity concept is 
arrived at by subtracting a "consumption" component from Y^ . 
He defines a "person's net contribution to 'society'" 
by the difference between the marginal consumption "associ­
ated with a change in family size" and gross value of output. 
The former concept is measured by considering families whose 
"heads" are of various age and income groups, so that one can 
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measure extra consumption associated with the addition of an 
Individual of a given age to a particular family (having so 
many children of such age and sex with income Y and age X, 
etc.). 
2. V reaches maximum when a is approximately 30— 
a 
sometimes termed "prime of life" (20, p. 431). At this age, 
V is between $20,000 and $30,000, implying a very high value 
a 
of an "average" person. 
3. On the average (over one's lifetime), a person's 
worth is over. $13,000 using net and a 10 per cent discount 
rate, and if we use r « 4^ , and a gross value for Y^  we get 
an average value of $33,000. The results apparently indicate 
that additional humans in the U.S. will, on the average, add 
to economic growth. This conclusion, however, may not be 
true for other countries. In fact, there are indications 
that the value of additional humans in India, once more on 
the average,, is zero or even negative (40, p. 433). 
4. Total human capital in the U.S. for 1950 Is esti­
mated at $1,335 billion (for r = 10^ ) and $2,752 billion 
(for r « 4^ ), compared to J88l billion for non-human capital 
in 1949. Corresponding net values were $1,055 billion and 
$2,218 billion for r ® 10^  and r = 4^  respectively. The 
implications that one might draw from these results are that 
more emphasis should be placed on human capital in the form 
of its maintenance and growth in the fields of education, 
health and retraining. 
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Another set of estimates is provided by Schultz, who uses 
a different method. His approach "rests on estimates of the 
investment in schooling in people who are in the labor force 
and the rate of return earned on this investment. The first, 
expressed as a stock of capital in 195^  dollars, came to 
$180 billion for 1930 and $535 billion for 1957 (35, P. 45). 
And while Schultz's figures are substantially below those of 
Weisbrod, the identical conclusions stand. 
A cost-of-production procedure is employed by Renshaw 
to arrive at one more set of estimates. Utilizing figures 
supplied by Schultz in an unpublished paper (37), estimates 
of total earnings and expenditures for high school and college 
and university education are converted into 1950 prices. 
Then, by "summing the figures from I9OO to 1950, one can ob­
tain a rough estimate of the stock of educational capital 
based on cost of production: $241.7 billion." With the use 
of some simplifying assumptions, Renshaw "endeavored to 
arrive at a stock figure by capitalizing median income dif­
ferentials existing in 1949. Discounted at a five per cent 
rate, the present value of these differentials amounts to 
$329.9 billion; at ten per cent, $201.4 billion" (32, p. 322). 
Undoubtedly there are many conceptual problems with the 
above estimates. As Weisbrod himself notes, "the estimates 
can be improved and extended. The benefits of doing so 
appear to make the costs worthwhile" (40, p. 436). Neverthe­
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less, all of the estimates point to the fact that the stock 
of educational capital in the U.S.—however defined—is of 
a substantial magnitude. 
Manpower and Educational Planning 
The idea of manpower planning has captured a wide audi­
ence in recent years, and as education constitutes one of. 
the prerequisites for the creation of a modern labor force, 
it, too> has been included in such schemes. One of the 
justifications for such planning has already, though only 
implicitly, been elaborated upon, namely, that the external 
costs and benefits of education prevent the formation of a 
"rational calculus" for educational supply and demand by both 
educational institutions and students (respectively). In two 
interesting articles, Blaug (7, 8) attempts to analyze this 
and other arguments for and. against the use of the manpower-
planning approach to educational policy-making as opposed to 
what Blaug calls the anti-manpower planning approach (the 
one which relies on market forces to determine the extent of 
education undertaken by the populace). 
Suppose that a meaningful "rational calculus" can be 
ascribed to students (or their parents) in choosing amounts 
of education (as well as fields of education). If r© 
is the rate of return to a particular type of education, 
while r^  is the best alternative investment opportunity rate, 
then, according to Blaug (7), we can expect that the demand 
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for that particular type of education will vary directly with 
r^  and inversely with r^ ,. Further, if suppliers of education • 
are similarly flexible, and if the "price of education" is 
defined as r^ /r^ , then it is expected that supply and demand 
will lead to an equilibrium point at p * 1, where the costs 
of education exactly match the benefits from that education. 
If we accept a strict anti-manpower planning approach, market 
forces will insure that such an equilibrium will actually be 
reached (sooner or later). Also, when we speak of costs and 
benefits, the divergences between the social and private 
counterparts of these will not be very significant. On the 
other hand, a strict manpower planning advocate would reject 
the possibility of such an equilibrium, arguing that a 
"rational calculus" cannot be assumed—i.e., students choose 
increments of education as well as areas of study not at all 
according to costs and returns, but rather according to 
other non-reconomic principles, (such as social prestige). 
Blaug (7, pp. 170-171).contends that in Britain an excess 
demand for education exists (point R In Figure 2-1), and 
that only a change in the supply of university education can 
alter the situation (which will yield a "non-equilibrium" 
price where r^  / r^ ). Blaug himself takes a middle.-of-the-
ground approach (7, p. 182): 
If there is anything to the idea of a rational edu­
cational calculus, enrollment projections that ignore 
earnings patterns in labour markets, and thus neglect 
the price-elasticity of demand for education, are 
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P=L 
P'<L 
q  q  
Figure 2-1. Demand and supply in an educational market 
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almost certain to go wrong. Likewise, manpower fore­
casts that indicate the minimum numbers of specially 
qualified people that will be required if certain 
targets for economic growth are to be realized are 
very likely to be misleading unless it is possible to 
control.the output of education by fields of special­
ization and, furthermore, to absorb the additional 
supply of educated people into employment without 
radical changes in earnings differentials; every 
radical change in earnings differentials will alter 
the demand of Industry for these people and the demand 
for like-minded people to acquire that sort of quali­
fication. In short, the interdependence between the 
"market" for extra education and the market for edu­
cated people makes it impossible to discuss either 
without reference to the other, 
To illustrate this interdependence, a 4-quadrant chart (Fig­
ure 2-2) is used by Blaug (20, p. 172). In the first quad­
rant, we have Figure 2-1 above. In the one below it, the 
demand for educated people as a function of the starting wage 
rate is sketched. To the left, in the third quadrant, age-
earnings profiles for different educational levels of the 
same profession (in this instance, technology graduates) are 
shown, and in the second quadrant we have the present values 
of future earnings streams for the given professions. The 
latter are derived as follows: Suppose that all of the costs 
of education are incurred in a lump sum fashion, and denote 
these by C. Further, suppose that only a certain portion, 
a , of the earnings differentials can be attributed to 
education (the other portion is attributed to ability, socio­
economic conditions, etc.). Then, if denotes the earnings 
differentials in year t, the rate of return, r^  is determined 
by: 
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Figure 2-2. Interdependence between the market for education 
/the market for educated people, age-earning pro­
file and present values--adapted from Blaug (7, 
p. 172) 
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(2-10) Present value «= % 
t=0 
Et 0 
(1 + ° 
Hence, in quadrant 2, we can depict the relationship between 
rg and C/a (8, pp. 252-261). 
Some models of educational planning 
In a forthcoming paper, Fox and Sengupta (15) compre­
hensively analyze a number of models of educational planning. 
Therefore, I shall be very brief in my comments. First, 
linear programming models, which may include only a part of . 
the total economy, or the economy as a whole with education 
as a separate sector—once more with many variations-which 
are discussed by Fox and Sengupta—have been employed. For 
example, Irma Adelman (l) attempts to build an optimization 
model for investment in formal education and in its optimal 
allocation simultaneously. The model thus combines the "man­
power requirement" and "cost-benefit" (or rate of return) 
approaches to the study of educational planning. A linear 
programming model for 4 periods of 5 years each is used with 
data partially characterizing the Argentine economy. The 
rest of the economy is disaggregated into Just nine sectors, 
and three different objective functions are used; 
a. Maximize the discounted value of GNP; 
b. Maximize the growth rate of the economy; 
c. Minimize the discounted sum of net foreign capital 
inflow. 
42 
The constraints to the program involve, among others, the 
structure of the Argentine educational system. 
While Adelman's model is quite instructive in so far 
as model-building is concerned, her specific results should 
be viewed with much skepticism—she herself warns us that 
the results should not be used indiscriminately. For ex­
ample, one outcome of the model is that only university 
graduates or drop-outs should be trained. Another is that 
commercial and vocational schools are not "utilized in the 
optimal school network." It seems that such results were 
obtained primarily because it was assumed by Adelman that 
the productivity of university graduates is 3-1/2 times that 
of secondary school graduates—which, as Bowles notes in the 
"Comment" to Adelman's article, is rather unlikely to be true. 
Another model has as Its purpose the provision of a 
"preliminary model that accomplishes" two objectives: (l) to 
develop "a method for projecting future labor requirements," 
and (2) to relate "these requirements to the output of the 
educational system" (ll). Chance uses a Leontief system 
for labor-skills', demand and a Markov-chain device for the 
supply of the various labor skills as a function of the edu­
cational system; he employs a number of simplifying assump­
tions to make the analysis manageable. In sum, a model is 
developed that will bring about a full-employment solution 
for the economy, via the use of the projections contemplated 
above. Chance also attempts to assess the economic value of 
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the new solution In comparison to sub-optimal solutions. 
Finally, a variety of other models have been developed, many 
of which are discussed by Pox and Sengupta (15). 
The Quality of Education 
Basically, two methods have been used to measure edu­
cational quality. The first—and perhaps the more widely 
used—utilizes a priori beliefs, as well as subjective judge­
ment concerning the choice of factors that are believed to 
affect school quality. The second, and the more objective 
of the two, purports to obtain a measure of school quality 
from test results which are objectively and impartially ad­
ministered to a large number of pupils over time and space. 
The subjective (first) approach is the easier one to 
use, but it entails a more difficult ratioftalization for its 
use on the part of its user. Hirsch, for example, built an 
index of "scope and quality" which is based upon what in 
his view, "many educators maintain..." (19, p. 31). While 
Hirsch is primarily concerned with primary and secondary 
schools," his quality index could be modified and extended 
into any type of schooling. Incidentally, we shall confine 
our attention in this section to sub-university schooling. 
Hirsch presents, first, an."ideal" model in which the follow­
ing variables are included; 
1. Class size. The implicit hypothesis is that the 
smaller the class size the better the scope and quality. To 
44 
measure class size one may use the average pupil-teacher 
ratio, using"as the number of students enrolled the average 
daily attendance (hereafter to be denoted ADA), rather than 
the number of registered pupils. However, such a measure 
may conceal much detail. Hirsch proposes, therefore, an 
additional measure, that is, whether the school will offer 
a course in mathematics or a foreign language if only 10 or 
15 students enrolled, 
2. Grouping: "many educators maintain that good edu­
cation. requires that, within limits, students of common 
ability and interest be grouped together." A specific quan­
titative measure of this factor is not discussed. 
3. Quality of the teaching staff: 
a. the per cent of experienced teachers; 
b. the background of the teaching staff—college 
training; 
c. "the method used for selecting new teachers 
and of appraising the quality of the existing 
staff;" . 
d. teaching load; and 
. e. the number and the variety-of specialists 
included (19, p. 32). 
4. Quality of school administration. "The leadership 
offered and ability of the school superintendent and his 
principals cannot be neglected; yet it is most difficult to 
appraise their contribution. Usually, principals v/ho are 
not relieved from teaching cannot do a superior"job." 
5.  Teaching program: Is there a good college prépara-
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tory program? "How far doeo the Mathematics program go?" 
Similar questions may be asked. 
While these items should, ideally, be put in the index 
of scope and quality, for practical reasons Hirsch"drops 
entirely factors (2) and (4). Further, other simplifications 
are made. All in all, we have the following model: 
(2-11) Q = g (A, B, C, D, E, F) 
where A « the number of teachers per 100 pupils in ADA, B = 
the number of college hours of the average teacher, C = 
average teacher salary, D = per cent of teachers with more 
than ten years of experience, E = the number of high school 
credit units, and P = per cent of high school seniors entering 
college. 
Given that the factors A, B, ..., P, were arbitrarily 
chosen, a weighting problem exists. To overcome this, Hirsch 
proposes equal weighting. This is justified as follows. 
First, "with six components to the index, the weighting 
system is no longer so very crucial. Doubling the weights of 
any one or two of the components will not greatly affect the 
magnitude of the index number." Further, a subjective test 
was carried on by Hirsch, in which the opinions of educators 
in the St. Louis area (in which the model was applied) were 
solicited as to the relative quality of the schools in the 
area. The rankings by the educators, "compared with the scope 
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and quality index data, showed very close consistency (19, pp. 
34-35). 
Another, and similar, model for measurement of school 
quality was constructed by Riev: (33). In his model, the 
following variables were used: 
= average teacher's salary; 
Xh = number of credit-units offered (a two-semester 
course meeting five times a week is counted as 
one unit); 
X^  = average number of courses taught per teacher. 
While data for other variables were also available, Riew 
omitted a number of them because they were strongly correlated 
with one of the above. Also, he chose to omit class size from 
his quality formula as there exists considerable controversy 
on whether or not this variable is of much consequence insofar 
as high school quality is concerned. 
Another model is provided by Welch (4l). His purpose is 
"to derive an estimate of the return to schooling from income 
data" which necessitates the adjustment of incomes "for dif­
ferences in variables which may otherwise introduce bias" (41, 
p. 380). In his view, the return to education can be defined 
by "the number of units of schooling multiplied by the prod­
uct of quality of schooling and the value of the marginal 
product of education." As a proxy for the quality component 
he uses a quality index, Q, as follows; 
(2-12) Q = ..... z/" 
4r 
The Z's are the various school inputs which, supposedly, affect 
quality. The particular inputs used in his models (separately 
or simultaneously) are: 
Zj,: "total current expenditure per pupil in attendance;" 
Zg: "average salary per member of instructorial staff;" 
Z^ : "members of staff per 100 pupils;" and 
Zh: "enrollment per secondary school"(4l, Table 4, 
 ^ p. 390). 
It will be noted that this set of inputs contains expenditure 
and enrollment figures as quality variables, whereas such 
variables were treated differently in the studies reported 
above. Further, "the original observations are for 57 'states,' 
10 southern states being designated as 2 'states,' one con­
sisting of white persons and the other of nonwhites" (4l, p. 
379). The use of a whole state—or a certain population 
segment thereof—as the unit of observation for the determi­
nation of school quality is far from satisfactory as long as 
control over school quality resides, for the most part, in 
the local school board. Nevertheless, Welch's study opens 
new frontiers in the economics of education concerning the 
introduction of the concept of the total production of 
schooling (as defined above) and the ways in which that con­
cept can (empirically) be estimated. 
So far we presented attempts to define the quality of 
education on the basis of school inputs chosen a priori. It 
would be desirable to find an "objective" measure of quality. 
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perhaps one that is based upon achievement tests of some sort. 
One such attempt has been made by Herbert Kiesling (23), al­
though his purpose was not to measure quality but rather to 
assess the efficiency of school districts in the state of 
New York. In any event, an "expenditure model" of type 2-13 
is formulated where 
(2-13) Y = P(a, b, c, d, E, u) 
the lower case letters represent school inputs, E is expend­
itures per pupil, u is a stochastic (or an error) term, and Y 
is total school output. 
Y, the output measure, is an average achievement score 
in a composite of standard subjects (based, for the most 
part, on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills). More interesting 
from our point of view is his "factor model" as in 2-14 
(2-14) Y = g(a, b, c, ..., n) 
2-14 is essentially a quality index of the "objective" type. 
Kiesling does.not attempt to estimate Y on the basis of the 
inputs, a, b, c, etc., taken simultaneously. Rather he 
studies the effect of each of the inputs (under consideration) 
taken separately upon the quality measure (Y). In any event, 
this is a study in which "output" and "quality" are defined 
not on a priori grounds but rather on the basis of some "ob­
jective" criteria. We shall make an attempt, in the next 
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chapter, to define quality in a 
empirical results, in our case. 
similar manner—although the 
are not very promising. 
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CHAPTER THREE. SOME QUALITY MODELS 
Model Building; Descriptive vs. Operational Models 
An historian may be content to describe or explain past 
occurrences on a verbal level. An economist cannot, however, 
satisfy himself with such descriptions or explanations. It 
is usually necessary, at some point, to make predictions, 
and these may or may not rest upon projections made from a 
descriptive model. 
We may illustrate the point by considering models of edu­
cational content. Let Yj_ denote quality of school i (of n 
schools) and X^j the jth (of a total of m) input or factor 
used by the ith school. Then, a multiple regression model 
may be developed, which will estimate the historical contribu­
tion of each of the Inputs to the quality Y. Thus 
(3-1) Y = a + 2 b.X, (j = 1, 2, ..., m) 
} ^ 
where Y is the estimated index of school quality. 
As far as description is concerned, we may have reached 
our goal. It can now be shown that, say, k of the m variables 
Xj, k - m, are statistically significant. - In other words, 
the k factors have, supposedly, exerted some appreciable in­
fluence in the "shaping" of the quality of school i. 
A school" administrator is likely, however, to be inter­
ested in the following problem; How can one maximize the 
quality of the school, given a certain budget constraint? 
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•Suppose, then, that a budget of B dollars" is available, and 
that factor Xj has a market price of Pj dollars per unit of 
Xj. Assuming linear relations between quality (Y) and each 
input, we then have the following problem: 
• m 
(3-2) maximize Y = 2 a^X, , j = 1,,2, ..., m j=l J 
m 
subject to 2 PjXj = BQ 
J=1 
The classical procedure in analyzing such a problem is 
familiar.^ Form 
m m 
w = 2 SjXj - X ( 2 PjXj - BQ) 
j=i j=i 
We now want to maximize W. Therefore, we take the following 
partial derivatives and Set them equal to zero. 
(3-3) ' ' = aj - X Pj = 0 , J = 1, 2, ..., m 
J 
m 
dW _ 2 p,X, - BL = 0 a x  -, "J J 0 j=l 
Equations 3-3 form the Ist-order conditions, which state: 
^See, e.g., Henderson and Quandt (l8, pp. 49-51). 
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1. for all 
J / k, -JL » ZL 
Pk 
In words, the (marginal) rate of substitution between 
factors j and k in the "production" of quality must 
be equal to the price ratio. 
2. .for all 
Q- a, 
J ^ k, ^ ^ . X 
That is, an extra dollar spent on Xj should increase quality 
by the same amount that an extra dollar spent on k would 
generate. 
A number of difficulties arise in connection with this 
procedure ; 
1. The budget (and any other) constraint must be stated 
in terms of an equality, while often an inequality, such as 
2 PjXj 2Ë J=l, 2, m 
J 
may be called for. 
2. If conditions of continuity as well as differenti­
ability hold, we are assured of only a relative maximum. 
There could yet be another maximum, called maximum maximorum, 
in which school quality may be found to be greater yet—with 
the same budget constraint. 
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3. Finally, due to "corner solutions," kinks and dis­
continuities in the respective functions, the classical pro­
cedure may not be operational at all. 
Fortunately, the field of mathematical, and in particular 
linear, programming has opened many more possibilities for 
the analysis of operational models. Thus, problem 3-2 may be 
restated in terms of a simple linear program: 
(3-4) maximize f(x) = 2 OjXj, J = 1, 2, ..., m 
j 
subject to 2 a.X. < B 
J 
An optimal solution to program 3-4, if such exists, would 
indicate to the school administrator the optimal intensity of 
factor use (if quality is to be maximized subject to staying 
within the limits set by the budget). 
Moreover, one can include in problem 3-4 not just one 
constraint, but as many as m (though not more than m). For 
example, in addition to the budget constraint, it may be 
specified that all teachers have at least four years of train­
ing, that the student-teacher ratio shall not exceed 35, that 
the per student value of building and equipment shall not be 
less than $1,000, and that the total number of units offered 
shall not be less than 25. For this particular example, the 
problem will be as follows: 
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m 
maximize f(x) = 2 , j = 1, 2, m 
j=l 
subject to 
*11%1 *12%2 1^3^ 3  ^*15^ 5 * * ^lm\ " 
*32*2 • <35 
4^3^ 3 - 1,000 
^54^4 - ^5 
One must note, however, that, first, a non-degenerate 
solution to the linear program (i.e., a solution which satis­
fies the constraints yet contains Xj / 0 for some j in the 
solution vector) may not exist at all. Also, even if an 
optimal solution is found, there may be another solution 
which yields the same value of the objective function. In 
other words, the uniqueness of the optimal solution, if such 
is found, cannot be assured. In any event, a considerable 
gain in insight can certainly be had from the use of linear 
1 programming models. 
Returning to the educational problem referred to above, 
it is necessary, first and foremost, to specify appropriate 
^My source is Ladd (27). 
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values of the coefficients, c^, in the objective function 
f(x) = 1 OjXj 
J 
Further, as the analysis of Chapter 2 indicates, it is nec­
essary, for a wide field of applications (see also Chapter 4) 
to establish a numerical index of quality. 
This, leads to the empirical formulation of the quality 
models of Chapter 3. 
The Empirical Models 
The basic model under consideration is; 
(3-5) Y = f (Xj, Xjj, X^) 
where Y, in general, denotes an index of school quality, and 
the X's represent the. various inputs of the school system. 
The variables which we shall use in subsequent models' are 
defined below: 
Y, = average composite score on the ITED (Iowa Tests 
of Educational Development) for the 12th grade 
.(class of 1963) 
Yo = difference between the average composite ITED 
score in the 12th grade and the average composite 
ITED score in the 10th grade 
Xg = total expenditure per pupil in average daily 
attendance, ADA 
Xo - average number of college semester hours per 
high school teaching assignment 
Xh = average number of different subject matter assign-
ments per high school teacher 
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= median high school teacher's salary 
Xg = number of course units offered 
Xy = building value per pupil in ADA 
Xg = number of pupils in ADA 
Xg = bonded indebtedness per pupil in ADA 
X^Q = number of pupils in ADA/humber of teachers 
X-,-, = average composite ITED score in 10th grade 
(class of 1961) 
To clarify the nature of the Iowa data concerning vari­
ables Yg, and Xg through X^^, we present the following 
tabulation; 
Vari­
able Units 
( 1 )  
Mean 
(N = 378) 
( 2 )  
Standard 
deviation 
(N = 378) 
Coefficient 
of 
variation 
[(2)-r(l)]100 
points 
points 
19.513 
4.279 
1.626 
1.023 — — 
dollars 
college hours 
407.335 
28.296 
60.688 
6.647 
14.90 
23.49 
% assignments dollars 2.215 5,252.277 0.676 608.967 30.52 11.59 
course units 
dollars 
33.351 
1,139.092 
10.184 
448.264 
30.54 
39.35 
% pupils thousands of dollars 286.687 157.082 448.989 100.965 156.61 64.28 
pupils 
points 
20.081 
15.234 
12.732 
1.397 
63.40 
57 
•In addition, we have constructed a set of "dummy" (i.e., zero-
one) variables, six of which may be classified as "area vari­
ables," and four of which represent variation due to differ­
ences in the population of the various districts. They are 
defined as follows: 
= 1—Mason City, Calmar and Dubuque areas^ 
0—all other areas 
Xn h = 1—Port, Dodge, Estherville, Sheldon and Sioux 
City areas 
0—all other areas 
X,- = 1—Ottumwa, Burlington areas 
0—all other areas 
X^g = 1—Creston, Council Bluffs area 
0—all other areas 
X^y = 1—Cedar Rapids, Bettendorf areas 
0—all other areas 
Xgg = 1—Ankeny area 
0—all other areas 
%8 ^—districts with population under 2,500 
0—all others 
X.„ = 1^-districts with population between 2,500 and 
5,000 
0—all others 
^See areas in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1. Sixteen Iowa school areas (m^ adapted from the 
Des Moines Register, September 1, 1967) 
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Xon "= 1—districts with population between 5,000 and 
10,000 
0—all others 
X„n « 1—districts with population between 10,000 and 
50,000 
0—all others 
Table 3-1 presents the results of multiple regression 
analyses which we have carried out on models of the general 
form 3-5. We used, first, the variable Yg as the proxy for 
school quality, inasmuch as we are'Interested in the contri­
bution of the high school to the development of the student 
rather than the contribution of the whole educational process 
from kindergarten through high school. Before any conclusions 
are attempted, we must note a number of features and charac­
teristics surrounding the ITED. 
1. These tests are administered by the school itself, 
though they are sent to the University of Iowa at Iowa City 
for processing and grading. While minor variations in the 
time limit may not be of much importance, it is quite obvious 
that some difference in the result between any two schools 
may be due to differences In the administration of the test. 
2. While the tests may discriminate well for classes 
in which students do not reach the "ceiling" of the test, 
this is not the case for superior students. Suppose that in 
one school half of the 12th graders are very bright pupils; 
they may easily reach the celling of the test. In fact, they 
could have made just as high a score on the 10th grade test. 
Table 3-1. Multiple regression equations utilizing 378 Iowa high school districts 
to determine factors influencing school quality (Yg)^ 
Equation Intercept X3 X4 
^5 %6 • ^7 
I 4.50 
(1.33) 
- .0187 
(.0102) 
- .2734 
(.1316) 
.000178 
(.000109) 
.0035» 
(.0105) 
- .0000041 
(.0001251) 
II 4.19 
( .71) 
- .0178 
(.0100) 
- .2768 
(.1152) 
.000194 
(.000107) 
.0047 
(.0099) 
.0000054 
(.0001224) 
III 4.36 
( .15) 
IV 4.71 
( .41) 
.52 
( .21) -,.17331 (.0648) 
- .1189 • 
(.0815) 
.0492 
(.0229) 
.0136 
(.0496) 
.0194 
(.0339) 
VI^ , .55» 
( .16) 
- .1495 
(.0643) 
- .1236 
(.0764) 
.0470 
(.0229) 
.0142 
(.0492) 
.0232 
(.0329) 
VII^ .68 
( .12) 
- .1318 
(.0627) 
- .1864 
(.0484) 
.0500 
(.0209) 
^Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors of coefficients. 
^Variables are transformed into logarithms. 
Table 3-1. (Continued) 
Equation Xg 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
VI^ 
VII^ 
X9 
.0000014 
(.0003885) 
- .000080 
(.000194) 
.00063 
(.00055) 
• .000205 
(.000527) 
.0602 
(.0470) 
,.0313: 
(.0336) 
- .0072. 
(.0101) 
.0017 
(.0097) 
^10 ^13 ^14 ^15 
.00299 .0752 - .104 - .273 
(.00448) (.2092) (.185) (.250) 
.0034 
(.0044) 
.1335 - .0998 - .164 
(.2091) (.1852) (.243) 
• .0218 .0082 - .0059 - .0334 
(.0380) (.0223) (.0198) (.0264) 
• .0126 
(.0375) 
• .0002 
(.0352) 
ers 
Table 3-1. (Continued) 
Equation X-j^g X^g 
I - .466 - .049 - .03 
(.225) (.204) (1.11) 
II 
III - .371 - .038 
(.219) (.203) 
IV - .614 
(.421) 
- .0616 - .0076 .0373 
(.0242) (.0216) (.0707) 
VI^ 
VII^ 
19 20 21 
.108 
(1.094) 
.105 
(1.062) 
.181 
(.953) 
.342 
(.424) 
.0466 
(.0644) 
- .198 
(.439) 
.0445 
(.0593) 
.322 
(.451) 
.0066 
(.0553) 
Table 3-1. (Continued) 
Equation X22 Mean Yg 
I - .183 4.270 
(.215) 
II 4.279 
III - .113 4.279 (.214) 
IV 4.279 
- .0200 .6199 
(.0229) 
vi^ .6199 
vii^ .6199 
Standard 
^ error of 
R P estimate 
.074 .030 1.612 1.009 
.047 .028 2.279 1.010 
.017 .004 1.094 1.023 
.027 .019 2.597 1.015 
.100 .057 2.216 0.1072 
.062 .045 3.088 0.1079 
.058 .050 5.752 0.1076 
Table 3-1. (Continued) 
Equation Intercept X3 
^4 =^5 % 4 
VIII° 4.30 - .0192 - .2372 .00020 
( .76) (.0109) (.1186) (.00011) 
IX® 4.19 - .0205 - .2213 .00019 - .0017 .000028 
( .86) (.0112) (.1555) (.00012) (.0174) (.000139) 
X^ 4.35 - .0174. - .4545 .00022 
(1.22) (.0215) (.2682) (.00017) 
XI^ 4.38 - .0163 - .3865 .00024 .0040 .00016 
(1.31) (.0223) (.2966) (.00019) (.0107) (.00023) 
®The 
^The 
equation Is 
equation is 
based on 290 observations 
based on 87 observations 
of Set 1 (see 
of Set 2 (see 
explanation in text), 
explanation in text). 
s 
Table 3-1. (Continued) 
Equation Xg X^^ X^^ X^^ X^^ 
VIII° .000006 
(.000584) 
IX® .0007 .000003 .0023 
(.0013) (.000598) (.0046) 
0005^ ^ 
(.0010) 
XI^ - .00011 .000018 - .0249 
(.00018) (.001178) (.0266) 
o 
Table 3-1. (Continued) 
Equation 
^16 '17 'l8 19 ^20 ^21 
VIII' 
IX 
rd 
XI"  ^
Table 3-1. (Continued) 
Standard 
g _o error of 
Equation Xgg Mean Yg R R F estimate 
VIII° 4.235 .031 .021 2.320 1.032 
IX® ' 4.235 .034 .010 1.237 1.038 
4.486 .071 .038 1.584 .755 
XI^ 4.486 .096 .016 1.044 .764 
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resulting In no net change In quality for that groupi It is 
therefore to be expected that in schools where the percentage 
of bright and well educated pupils exceeds the average for 
the state of Iowa, the variable Yg may not be appropriate. 
3. Although academic achievement and intelligence are 
supposed to be, on the average, highly correlated, there may 
be cases in which the ITED will reflect the intelligence of 
the pupils, rather than the quality of the academic program. 
In other words, it may be necessary to make some corrections 
for differences in native ability, though, in general, such 
corrections in school averages do not seem to be of much 
importance. 
4. It must be realized that the ITED cover predomi­
nantly the "three R's" and other common areas such as social 
sciences and basic sciences. These tests, then, fail by 
their very nature to cover the full scope of the educational 
program in the school. It is quite likely that schools 
which are equally good insofar as the subject matters tested 
in the ITED are concerned differ greatly in the. quality, as 
well as the quantity, of other important subjects. In this 
sense, the use of or Yg as a quality index falls far 
short of the.mark. This point will apply in particular for 
observed quality differences between the large and small 
high schools. That is, vfhile the latter may well excel in 
the subjects tested by the ITED, they are more likely (than 
the former) to lack in the presentation of diverse subject-
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matters in quantity and quality. 
Furthermore, the models utilized below include only the 
factors for which quantitative data were available. There 
may be some important factors which should have been included 
but which were excluded for lack,of information. For in­
stance, we do not have sufficient information•on the experi-
, ence of the "average teacher" for each school, and hence 
could not include an experience variable in. the model. Sim­
ilarly, some information on the socio-economic composition 
of the population of the district, as well as rates of em­
ployment growth and the like, could be quite instructive. It 
is not surprising, then, that our empirical models do not show 
as good explanatory power as we would hâve liked them to dem­
onstrate. 
Several sub-models of type 3-5 were tried, some of which 
are reported in Table 3-1. Equation I of this table is an 
additive multiple regression equation, in which we have in­
cluded, in addition to the factor inputs, also the "dummy" 
variables. The results are somewhat disappointing; but in 
the light of our previous analysis, it is not surprising. 
Moreover, we do find some of the factors to contribute sig­
nificantly (in the.statistical sense) to the overall .index 
of quality. Specifically, variables X^, and X^ show a 
measure of statistical significance. That is to say, the 
analyses suggest that an increase in the median salary level 
of Iowa high schools, on the average, will tend to raise the 
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index of quality and that a decrease in the number of assign­
ments per teacher will also result in improved quality; they 
imply, somewhat surprisingly, that an increase in the average 
number of college hours per teaching assignment tend, other 
things equal, to.lower the overall level of quality as meas­
ured by ITED. 
The purpose of Equations II, III and IV of Table 3-1 
was to assess the Importance of the several groups of vari­
ables involved in Equation I. It is immediately apparent 
that the area variables are of no statistical importance in 
explaining the variation in Y2. Equation IV suggests that 
population of school district may have a. slight association 
with school quality. . However, if both sets of the dummy 
variables are dropped from the model altogether, explanatory 
power of our model is not significantly affected. To see 
P —2 this, one must compute the value of the corrected R (R in 
Table 3-1—the coefficient of determination corrected for 
the degrees of freedom). A convenient formula has been ob­
tained by R. J. Wheery (42). Let R be the estimated corre­
lation obtaining in the universe, R the observed multiple 
correlation coefficient, M the number of independent variables, 
and N the number of observations. Then the corrected R^ is 
given by 
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The appropriate values for have been computed for selected 
equations, and are reported in some of the tables. A casual 
observation of the results of the use of this formula is 
striking: the "real" reduction in due to the omission of 
some ten dummy variables is only 0.002—not .027 as we would 
—P have thought had the R 's not been computed. 
An attempt to improve the "fit" of the model was made 
in Equations V, VI and VII. For these equations, the vari­
ables—all except the dummy ones—were transformed into loga­
rithms. In essence, we assumed that instead of an additive 
model, a multiplicative one may have been more appropriate. 
On the whole, the ,logarithmic model performs better, although 
the difference is not very great. Whereas the full additive 
model "explains" about 3 per cent of the total variation in 
quality (after correçjjjions) the corresponding logarithmic 
model "explains" as much as $.7 per cent. But we still ex­
plain only a very small portion of the variation in Yg. A 
comparison of the results of Equations VI and VII suggests, 
in addition to the conclusion about the dummy variables ob­
tained for the additive model, that many'-of the factor in­
puts (taken as a group) contribute little or nothing to the 
explanatory power of the model. We are left, once more, with 
variables 3, 4 and 5 as the variables of possible explanatory 
value. 
As we have mentioned above, it appears, on intuitive 
grounds, that the quality indices for the larger school dis-
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trlcts may well be different from those of the smaller ones. 
In an attempt to gauge the statistical nature of such alledged 
differences, we divided the data into two sets. Set 1 con­
tains all districts whose total populations in i960 were less 
than 5,000. Set 2, in turn, contains the districts whose 
total populations were 5,000 or more in 1960.^ Some of the 
results of this investigation are shown in Table 3-1. The 
differences between the results for the two size groups are 
not significant. 
So far we have used the difference between the test 
scores that were obtained in 12th grade and those which were 
obtained in the 10th grade as the measure of quality. There 
may be some justification for the use of the 12th grade score, 
as the index of quality, particularly b.ecause of the 
"ceiling" problem which we had occasion to mention before. In 
essence, two models seem appropriate; one would simply substi­
tute for Yg, while the second would, in addition, include 
as an independent variable. The rationale for the use of 
the second model is, perhaps, at the core of the economics of 
education, namely, that not only factors which use (or sacri­
fice) physical capital are of importance; the human element 
as such is also an important factor of production. In that 
sense, the 10th grade score underlies the basic human element 
^Data on the districts' populations were obtained from 
(22). See also Table 3-4. 
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with which the school must operate, and hence it may repre­
sent that important human element, A number of specific 
investigations were made with each of the above models, many 
of which are reported in Tables 3-2 and 3-3 below. 
Some increase in explanatory power is achieved by the 
use of the first model. Further, the coefficient of 
comes out to be positive—as we would expect it to be a 
priori. In addition, we have some evidence (Equations II and 
III of Table 3-2) that the dummy variables, taken separately, 
do explain a significant, though very small, portion of the 
variation in Another interesting result of the model 
can be seen when Equations IV and V of Table 3-2 are compared. 
In that comparison, the model "explains" much better for Set 2 
(see above) than for Set 1. 
Turning our attention to the second model (where is 
included as an independent variable), one observation is that 
increases a great deal (compared to all previous models). 
The reason for this is the very large simple correlation be­
tween X^^ and (which, in the original data, equals' to 
0.7808). Once again, many versions of the model were attempt-
p 
ed, and the results, except for the higher R , as well as the 
addition of X^]^ as a "key" factor, are not much different 
(that is, only Xg, X/j. and X^ come out to be significant; the 
dummy variables do not add much to the total explanatory 
power of the model; and the coefficient of X^ still turns out 
Table 3-2. Factors affecting school quality, YT, for 378 %owa high schools (196I-
62)a 
Equation Mean Y, Intercept X. X4 X. X, 
I 
II 
III 
IVb 
V® 
19.51 
19.51 
19.51 
19.34 
20.10 
16.94 
( 2.04) 
(^^.*24) 
19.88 
( .65) 
18.52 
( 1.42) 
14.56 
( 2.41) 
.0225 
(.0156) 
.01414 
(.01750) 
.0336 
(.0355) 
• .1861 
(.2014) 
• .2616 
(.2277) 
- .0610 
(.5069) 
.000489 
(.000168) 
.000465 
(.000189) 
.000570 
(.000329) 
• .01357 
(.01620) 
.0219 
(.0235) 
.0047 
(.0160) 
^Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors of coefficients. 
^Based upon 29O districts whose populations, as of i960, were below 5,000. 
®Based upon 87 districts whose populations, as of I96O, were 5,000 or more. 
Table 3-2. (Continued) 
Equation 
'8 10 13 14 
II 
III 
- .000033 .000282 - .001178 - .00571 
(.000191) (.000594) (.000847) (.00686) 
- .4693^ 
(.3202) 
^ .443 
(.329) 
,.1533: 
(.2832) 
,.11591 
(.2918) 
IV"^ 
v* 
00135, 
(.00095) 
.00139 (.00200) 
• .00418 - ,5844 - .0267 
(.00730) (.3793) (.3331) 
• .0128 - .0389 .9986 (.0446) (.5397) (.5159) 
Table 3-2. (Continued) 
Equation *17 *l8 *19 *20 
I - .9147 - .6239 - .4017 .6824 .762 1.008 
( .3834) (.3445) (.3125) (1.7015) (1.675) (1.626) 
II - .7402 - .6394 - .4050 
( .3833) (.3455) (.3212) 
III - .6366 - .4260 .1554 
( .6643) ( .6683) ( .6915) 
iv^ - .5505 .7110 - .6235 .0772 7^ 
( .4717) (.4029) (.3775) ( .2241) 
v° - 1.291 - .0571 - .0226 1.0731 
( .5922) (.6069) (.5087) ( .7759) 
Table 3-2. (Continued) 
Standard 
p _p error of 
Equation Xgg R R F estimate 
I .9641 - .385 .1413 .1007 3.283 1.544 
(1.4595) (.329) 
II - .2778 .0342 .0212 2.192 1.611 
(.3381) 
III .3635 .0439 .0362 4.286 1.598 
( .7113) 
IV^ - .4884 .0848 .0451 1.967 I.613 
(.3978) 
V® 1.1376 - .1762 .3700 .2578 3.021 1.195 
( .7172) (.5199) 
Table 3-3. Factors influencing 
(1961-62)% 
school quality. Y^, for 378 Iowa high schools 
Equation Mean Yj Intercept X3. X4 . %5 %6 
I 19.51 5.822 
(1.412) 
- .0141 
(.0102) -,.2575, (.1303) 
.000214 
(.000109) 
.0016 
(.0105) 
II 19.51 5.669 ( .810) - .0134 (.0097) - .2673^ (.1019) 
.000241 
(.000100) 
III 19.51 5.646 
( .862) 
- .0127 (.0101) 
- .2692 
(.1142) 8
8
 
.00204 
(.00987) 
IV^ 1.289 .428 
( .052) 
- .03049 
(.01330) 
- .02053 
(.01654) 
.01005 
(.00464) 
.00373 
(.01007) 
yb 1.289 .431 
( .044) 
- .0256 
(.0132) 
-,.0235, 
(.0154) 
.00970 
(.00464) 
.00325 
(.01000) 
VI^ 1.289 .458 
( .039) 
- .0222 
(.0129) - .0334-(.0098) 
.01045 
(.00425) 
^'Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors of coefficients. 
^Variables (excluding - Xgg) are transformed into logarithms. 
Table 3-3. (Continued) 
Equation Xy Xg 
I 
II 
III 
IV^ 
• .0000067 
(.0001238) 
.000010 
(.000121) 
.00587 
(.00688) 
.00659 
(.00669) 
.000059 (.000384) 
• .000066 
(.000193) 
.01108 
(.00955) 
.00503 (.00682) 
VI' 
10 11 '13 
.000692 
(.000548) 
.000245 
(.000522) 
.00205 
(.00206) 
.00021 
(.00198) 
.00192 
(.00445) 
.00249 
(.00432) 
.00257 
(.00438) 
- .00416 
(.00772) 
. .00200 
(.00761) 
- .00006 
(.00715) 
.8866 
(.0396) 
.8857 
(.0380) 
.8851 
(.0385) 
.7026 
(.0297) 
,.7055. (.0289) 
.7072 (.0286) 
.0229 (.2083) 
.00139 (.00455) vo 
Table 3-3. (Continued) 
Equation ^13 
I - .0766 - .3442 
(.1834) (.2493) 
II 
III 
IV^ - .00050 - .0086 
(.00402) (.0054) 
VI^ 
^16 ^17 *18 ^9 
.5061. - .0905 .1225 .2575 
(.2229)^ (.2026) (1.1010) (1.0840) 
.0117 - .00220 .00711 .0091 
(.0049) (.00440) (.01436) (.0130) 
Table 3-3. (Continued) 
Equation Xg^ 
I .2838 - .0174 
(1.0527) (.9451) 
II 
III 
IV^ .0091 .0022 
VI^ 
(.0120) (.0112) 
Standard 
o error of 
X R R F estimate 
.2024 .6416 .6237 33.74 .999 
(.2134) 
.6299 .6259 126.63 .996 
.6302 .6221 69.69 1.001 
.00333 .6612 .6441 . 36.67 .021 
(.00465) 
.6476 .6399 74.95 .021 
16459 .6420 135.36 .021 
Table 3-3. (Continued) 
Equation Mean Intercept X3 =4 
^5 *6 
VII° 19.34 5.737^ 
(1.040) 
- .0164 
(.0112) -,.2137' (.1540) 
.000232 
(.000122) 
- .0065 
(:0173) 
VIII^ 20.10 4.822 
(1.591) 
- .0124 
(.0229) 
- .3144 
(.2998) 
.000276 
(.000203) .0035, (.0109) 
Ixb'O 1.28 , '433, 
( .053) 
- .0277 
(.0146) 
- .0142 
(.0199) 
.0112 
(.0055) 
- .0049 
(.0174) 
xb,d 1.30 .085 
( .193) 
- .0090 
(.0375) 
- .0293 (.0250) 
.1029 
(.0569) 
.00745 (.00968) 
00 
ro 
'^Based upon 290 districts whose populations, as of 196O, were below 5,000. 
^Based upon 87 districts whose populations, as of i960, were 5,000 or more. 
Table 3-3. (Continued) 
Equation X, 8 10 11 X 13 
vir .000032 
(.000138) 
.00085 
(.00135) 
• .000102 
(.000593) 
.00162 (.00466) .8863 (.0432) 
VIII* 
IX^'C 
xb,d 
.000169 
(.000237) 
.0046 (.0084) , 
.0136 (.0104) 
- .000115 
(.000185) 
.0164 
(.0103) 
- .0130 
(.0097) 
.00018 
(.00120) 
• .00036 
(.00222) 
• .00204 
(.00532) 
• .0291 
(.0269) 
- .00216 (.00844) 
• .0251 
(.0257) 
.9484 (.0800) 
-6934 
(.0335) 
.7267^ (.0605) 
Table 3-3. (Continued) 
Equation ^14 ^15 ^16 ^17 ^18 *19 
VII° 
VIII^ 
Table 3-3. (Continued) 
Standard 
r> _p error of 
Equation X^q Xgg R R P estimate 
VII® .6230 .6122 51.41 1.028 
VIIlG .7196 .6908 21.95 .771 
Ixb'C .6222 .6114 51.25 .023 
.7333 .7059 23.53 .016 
Table 3-4. Means and standard deviations of selected variables and models^ 
Model Yg Y^ Xg X^ X X^^ 
Additive, 378 4.279 19-51 28.29 2.215 5,252.77 15.23 
observations (1.023) (1.62) (6.64) (.676) (608.96) (1.397) 
Logarithmic, 377 .6199 I.2890 1.4390 .3233 3.7013 . I.I8O8 
observations ( .IIO3) ( .0364) ( .IO87) (.1430) ( .2732) . ( .04030) 
Additive, 149 4.330 19-52 28.08 2.30 5,218.42 15.19 
observations ( .996) (1.42) (7.10) (.733) (63O.6O) (1.23) 
Additive, 290 4.235 19.34 26.50 2.454 5,105-44 15.10 
observations (l.04l) (1.64) (5-93) (.551) (548.69) (1.43) 
(Set 1) 
Additive, 88 4.486 20.10 34.29 1.415 5,745.03 15.62 
observations ( .765) (1.37) (5.31) (.374) (543.59) (1.15) 
(Set 2) 
Additive, 166 ^  4,142 19.25 25-70 2.654 5,003-94 15-11 
observations" (I.109) (1.86) (6.52) (.537) (649.06) (1.58) 
^Figures in parentheses are standard deviations of variables. 
^Data are for all districts whose 196O populations were under 2,500. 
Table 3-4. (Continued) 
Model ?2 ?l %4 *5 *11 
Additive, 124 
observations^ 
4.361 
( .932) 
19.46 
(1.29) U'.m) 
2.187 
(.448) 
5,241.33, 
(331.24) 
15.10 
(1.22) 
Additive, 49 
observations" 
4.518 
( .803) 
20.03 
(1.56) 
32.44 
(4.44) 
1.5831 
(.385) 
5,528.38 
(449.40) ll'M) 
Additive, 38 
observations® 
• 4.444 
( .722) 
. 20.18 
(1.10) 
36.67" 
(5.43) 
1.198 
(.217) 
6,024.39 
(531.52) (i:o4) 
®Data are for all districts whose i960 populations were between 2,000 and 
5,000. 
^Data are for all districts whose i960 populations were between 5,000 and 
10,000. 
®Data are for all districts whose I96O populations were over 10,000. 
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to be negative) from those achieved by models utilizing Yg as 
the index of quality (see Table 3-3). Finally, a 'logarithmic 
version of the model was also tried, and a comparison of such 
equations as II and VI of Table 3-3 suggests that the multi­
plicative model provides a (very) slightly better fit than 
the additive model.^ 
A Sampling Experiment 
Prior to the analysis of the full data set (of 378 school 
districts) we chose a somewhat "representative" sample of five 
areas (Mason City area. Port Dodge area, Ottumwa area. Creston 
area and the Cedar Rapids area) in which l49 school districts 
p 
were observed. It was felt that these areas encompass a 
great deal of the different economic regions in Iowa, and 
therefore the results should not be much different than if the 
whole state was our geographical base. 
The results of our investigation are presented in Table 
3-5. It must be noted that a direct comparison with our pre­
vious models cannot be made, insofar as the dummy variables 
are concerned, because variables X^ij. through were defined 
differently^ (i.e., X^^j. ~ ^  for Port Dodge area, 0 otherwise; 
^In addition, a multiplicative model is useful in that 
the coefficients which we obtain are elasticities rather than 
slopes. That is, if the coefficient of variable X, is a,, 
the implication is that if X^ is changed by 1 per cent, the 
dependent variable, Y, will change by a^ per cent. 
^These areas can be observed in Figure 3-1. 
Table 3-5. Multiple regression equations determining factors influencing school 
quality: 149 districts^ 
Equation Intercept X, 8 
1° 
lib 
111% 
IV® 
V® 
ViC 
6.12 
(3.46) 
3.80 
(1.18) 
4.12 
(1.10) 
9.50 (3.55) 
19.51. (1.62) 
,7.07" 
(1.47) 
- .0257 
(.0143) 
- .0250 
(.0142) 
- .0267 
(.0139) 
- .0179'' 
(.0141) 
.01318 
(.01941) 
- .0180 
(.0139) 
• .2020 
(.1948) 
• .2933 
(.1707) 
- .2990 
(.1695) 
- .2413 
(.1896) 
• .5655 (.2328) 
- .3491^ (.1661) 
.000188 
(.000156) 
.000271 
(.000152) 
.000255 
(.000149) 
.000199 
(.000151) 
.000402 
(.000207) 
.000292 
(.000145) 
.0036 
(.0173) 
.0086 
(.0145) 
.0017 
(.0110) 
• .0031 
(.0169) 
. .0383^ 
(.0198) 
- .0038 
(.0109) 
.000042 
(.000213) 
.000038 
(.000207) 
.000091 
(.000277) 
- .000355 
(.000925) 
- .000245 
(.000324) 
- .000267 
(.000898) 
.000451 
(.000442) 
^Numbers in parentheses indicate standard error of coefficients. 
D^ependent variable is whose mean Yg = 4.33. 
'Dependent variable is Y^,whose mean Y^ = 19.52. 
Table 3-5. (Continued) 
Equation X, X 10 11 14 15 '16 17 
II" 
III^ 
IV° 
yc 
VI® 
.000973 
(.000873) 
.000945 (.000806) 
- .000202 
(.000935) 
.00029 
(.00119) 
.000854 
(.000786) 
.00517 (.00568) 
.00565 
(.00561) 
.00561 
(.00558) 
.00184 
(.00562) 
- .00788 
(.00766) 
.00294 
(.00552) 
- .5178 - .8282 
(.2577) (.3064) 
.7907 - .4212 - .9097 (.0698) (.2523) (.2988) 
.8011 
(.0681) 
,.7339\ 
(.3145) 
• .7324 
(.3054) 
.5764 
(.2537) 
.5595, 
(.2465) 
Table 3-5. (Continued) 
Equation X^g X^^ X^^ F 
- 1.455 - 1.181 - .958 - 1.027 1.61 .163 
(3.261) . (3.235) (3.177) (2.728) 
il^ 1.68 .087 
2.17 .084 
IV° - 1.562 - 1.298 - 1.039 - 1.007 12.46 .618 
(3.167) (3.142) (3.086) (2.649) 
V° 3.64 .172 
VI° 27.66 .578 
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= 1 for Ottumwa area; = 1 for Creston area, and X^y = 
1 for the Cedar Rapids area, and 0 otherwise). On the other 
hand, one may compare, say. Equations II of Table 3-5 and II 
of Table 3-1. And while the size of the coefficients, as 
well as the R^'s are not precisely the same, it may be said 
that much of the information that Table 3-5 provides us 
would lead us to the same conclusions that were obtained by 
analyzing the full data set. 
Some Concluding Remarks 
An attempt has been made to estimate the quantitative 
effects of some of the factors that may affect school quality 
or Yg Iowa. More refined methods can surely be devised, 
and much is constantly done by educators to improve the use­
fulness of such devices as the ITED. Although our models 
have not exhibited much explanatory power, some things have 
been learned-in the process. A few factors of the educational 
input system proved to be statistically significant in their 
relation to changes in the level of quality, however we chose 
to define it. Note, however, that the standard errors of the 
coefficients of X^, X^ and X^ are quite large, so that we 
cannot claim very much for the results on statistical grounds. 
VJe have not yet had our last say on the use and con­
struction of operational quality models. But before an "al­
ternative approach" is taken in Chapter 5, we wish, first, 
to turn our attention to an important and interesting appli­
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cation of the models which we have developed and tested thus 
far. This will be done in Chapter 4. 
We must also recognize that an aggregation problem 
exists, so that implications from any quality model must be 
drawn with extra caution (see the Appendix for a detailed 
discussion). 
Table 3-6. Simple correlation coefficients of the variables discussed in the text 
(for the 378 Iowa districts, 196I-62). 
?2 ^2 *3 ^=6 
^2 1.0000 
• . -
Xg -0.0266 1.0000 
X3 0.0358 -0.0827 1.0000 
X4 -0.1694 0.2998 -0.5507 J 1.0000 
^5 0.1592 -0.0668 0.4561 -0.4786 1.0000 
% 0.1275 -0.2148 0.4917 -0.6309 0.5351 1.0000 
0.0251 0.3962 0.1382 0.0049 0.1507 -0.0348 
^8 0.0878 -0.1988 0.4310 -0.5038 0.4292 0.8007 
X9 0.0070 -0.0180 0.1051 -0.0430 0.0248 0.0256 
^10 -0.0352 -0.0618 -0.0749 0.3339 -0.0974 -0.1034 
Xll -0.1047 0.0060 0.2311 -0.1390 0.2073 0.0643 
?1 0.5200 -0.0087 0.2191 -0.2199 0.2742 0.1317 
Table 3-6. (Continued) 
^7 ^10 ^11 ?i 
^=7 1.0000 
^8 0.0167 1.0000 
Xg 0.1801 0.0163 1.0000 
^10 -0.0313 -0.0506 -0.0157 1.0000 
%11 0.0593 0.0709 -0.0213 -0.0777 1.0000 
?! 0.0670 0.1135 -0.0128 -0.0879 0.7944 1.0000 
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CHAPTER POUR. ECONOMICS OP SCALE IN HIGH SCHOOL OPERATIONS 
Although our analysis of the quality models based upon 
the results of the ITED (Iowa Tests of Educational Develop­
ment) scores for Iowa high schools did not fulfill our hopes 
concerning the use of such models for educational policy­
making, the same variables yield an interesting by-product. 
This by-product should be of interest to school administra­
tors who may have some control over school size, if they 
desire to arrive at an "optimal" decision from an ecomic 
standpoint. 
A case in a point may be the question of consolidation. 
While there exist many problems in any such endeavor, the 
subject of economies of scale is often considered to be of 
overriding importance. Thus, casual observation of the Iowa 
data for 1962-63 school years reveals that school size and 
total expenditures per pupil are definitely related—the 
smaller the school (in terms of the average daily attendance 
of high school students) the higher the level of expenditures 
per pupil (in ADA), on the average, are expected to be. How­
ever, if consolidation implies loss in the quality of in­
struction, the expected lower per pupil costs are quite mis­
leading. On the other hand, if consolidation reinforces,the 
quality of instruction, the mere casual observation of reduced 
per pupil costs does not tell the extent of the "true" benefits 
from consolidation. 
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It is, therefore, necessary to make "corrections" for 
quality differences in the final effect of school size upon 
costs per pupil. Second, given that such corrections are 
made, it may be possible to find an "optimum" size of a high 
school (for a given area and time period, of course), al­
though, as we shall see, such an optimum is not so easy to 
construct. Also, in the course of the chapter, some tenta­
tive results will be presented as to the existence of econ­
omies of scale in Iowa high school operations and on the 
"optimum" size of a high school for Iowa (for the period 
1962-63). 
Corrections for Quality Differences 
The first to attempt a "corrected economies of scale" 
model was John Riew (33) in an article in which examined 
possible economies of scale in Wisconsin high school opera­
tions. His model, basically, is 
(4-1) E = f(Q, ADA) 
where E denotes expenditures per pupil, Q is an index of 
school quality, and ADA is the average daily attendance record 
for the high school. Specifically, Riew's model contains the 
following multiple regression (single equation) model: 
(4-2) Xg = a + bXg + cXg + dXj^ + eX^ + fX^ + gZj + hZg 
where Xg, X^, X^ and Xg are as defined in Chapter 3 (except 
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for minor variations as to the exact definitions of each 
variable), and 
= change in enrollment between 1957 and i960 
Zg = per cent of classrooms built after 1950. 
While model 4-2 does, correct for quality differences, 
"quality" is defined by a combination of the variables X/j., 
and Xg. These variables were chosen not by recourse to 
some objective criterion, such as the ITED, but merely by the 
use of accepted beliefs. 
A particularly interesting version of 4-1 would be 
(4-3) \ ® a + bXg + cXg^ + dYg 
where Yg is the difference between the ITED composite score 
achieved at the 12th grade level and that of the 10th grade 
level. In addition, other versions of 4-1 may be formulated, 
some of which are reported in Table 4-1. In each case X2, 
operating expenditures per pupil, is the dependent variable 
and Xg, the number of pupils- in average daily attendance, is 
the independent variable of primary importance. 
It is apparent that, whichever specific model one may 
wish to choose, we can conclude with a high degree of (statis­
tical) significance that economies of scale do exist in Iowa 
high schools, even after differences in quality are taken 
into account. Further, Equations IV and V of Table 4-1, in 
2 
which the coefficient of Xg is significantly positive. 
Table 4-1. Factors influencing expenditures per pupil for 377 lovja high school 
districts (1962-63)^ 
Equation Intercept Xg (ADA) X^ . X^ 
2.283 2.78 
( .02) 
0
0
 1 
H
 
H
 D*
 
2.283 2.47 
( .07) 
- .093 
(.015) 
.0697 
(.0298) 
.0278 
(.0354) 
-.021 
(.010) 
III 287.30 437.00 
( 5.04) 
- .147 
(.020) 
.000049 
(.000008) 
IV 287.30 433.70 
(13.19) 
- .147 
(.020) 
.000049 
(.000008) 
V 287.30 263.45 
(34.82) 
-,.177\ 
(.031) . 
.0000537 
(.0000099) 
1.14 
(.49) 
20.20 
(6.25) 
.00404 
(.00525) 
^Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors of coefficients. 
^Variables are transformed into the logarithms. 
= mean of expenditures per pupil. • 
Table 4-1. (Continued) 
Equation X, X 
10 
Y- F 
11^ 
III 
IV 
V 
.0702 .1068 ( .0228) (.0152) 
,1.357' 
( .512) 
,.053i ( .006) 
- .020 
(.004) 
- .061 (.026) 
- .0636 
(.0174) 
-,'639, 
(.218) 
. 0064 
(.0262) 
, '79x (2.94) 
42.12 .190 
24.25 .345 
27.19 .1269 
18.11 .1271 
20.85 .338 
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suggest that diminishing marginal returns are likely to occur 
beyond a certain point. 
An Optimal School Size 
In his paper, Riewargued that a model such as Equation 
4-2 above can serve to estimate the optimal size of a high 
school (or, in our case, perhaps a high school district size). 
His argument is thus; Form 
(4-4) X . a + bXg + oXq + b^Q 
where b^Q is a composite index of quality (and other variables). 
Now take 
(4-5) aXg/ aXg = b + 2CXQ 
and set the result in 4-5 equal to 0. Then we get: 
(4-6) Xg' = -b/2c 
where Xg refers to the optimal ADA for a high school.-
The results which Riew obtained for Wisconsin (optimal 
ADA = 1,675) are not without their pitfalls. In the, first 
place, just because a quadratic component seems to be signif­
icant is not necessarily an indication that diminishing total 
returns ever set in. It may well be that optimal school size 
is anywhere between 1,675 and infinity. That is, using 
Equation 4-7, ôXg/ dXg = -cXg"^ and ôXg/ ôXg = 0 
only vjhen Xg approaches infinity. To illustrate the point. 
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one may fit the same data for a rectangular hyperbola, i.e., 
we form: 
(4-7) Xg = a + bqQ + cXg"^  
Equations I and II of Table 4-2 present two variants of model 
4-7. It appears that, for the case of Iowa, a model such as 
4-7 better fits the data than its counterpart in 4-4. Hence, 
it cannot be argued forcefully that a true optimum school 
size can actually so easily be determined. We obviously need 
more information. 
* 
In addition, one should obtain confidence limits for Xg. 
A simple procedure for obtaining such limits can be illus­
trated as follows.1 Let 
R = Wg / 
where Wg = -b, w^  = 2c, and R = Xg. Now the statement 
R = Wg / WQ  ^ is identical to the statement Wg - Rw^  = 0. 
In this procedure, "the known method of setting confidence 
limits to the difference Wg - Rw^  is employed to determine a 
2 
confidence interval for R." Since 
=22=® 
2 
Oll8 
2 
*128^  
T^his procedure is presented by Fuller (16, pp. 82-86). 
T^he c^ j are elements of a 2 x 2 matrix C, where Cs^  is 
the estimated variance-c©variance matrix of w^  and Wg. 
Var(w2) = 
Var(w2_) = 
Cov(w^ ,W2) = 
Table 4-2. Multiple regression equations determining factors described in model 
4-7 for 377 Iowa high school districts (1962-63)®' 
Equation Intercept Xg X^  ^ X^  Xg 
I 362.11 6,831.97 
( 5.15) (667.85) 
II 253.62 ' 7,240.41 .703 7.45 .0029 .536 
(32.51) (957.44) (.473) (6.54) (.0050) (.350) 
-^Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors of coefficients. Also, the 
value of Xg = 287.30. 
Table 4-2. (Continued) 
Equation Xy Xg X^ Q F 
104.64 ,218 
II .0476 
(.0058) • .037^  (.025) ,.587' (.211) 27.93 377 
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Table 4-3. Simple correlation coefficients for the Iowa 
data (377 observations) and the variables used 
in the text®-
Xg Xg • 
1,0000 -0.2004 0.4671 -0.0972 
% -0.2004 1.0000 -0.4798 0.9506 
f
—
1
 
0.4671 -0.4798 1.0000 - 0.2805 
-0.0972 0.9506 -0.2805 1.0000 
^2 
-0.0698 . 0.0917 -0.1542 0.0602 
^3 
-0.0855 0.4313 -0.4541 0.2947 
X4 -0.2186 -0.5041 0.7436 -0.3160 
-0.0673 0.4293 -0.4141 0.3119 
% -0.2186 0.8008 -0.6188 0.6632 
4 
0.4071 0.0136 0.0736 0.0175 
0.0011 0.0133 -0.0585 0.0213 
%10 -0.0678 -0.0495 0.1280 ' -0.0209 
P^or other correlation coefficients see Table 3-6 of 
Chapter 3. 
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"it follows that the a  confidence interval of [ R = Xg ] 
is defined by those values of R such that 
r ("2 • ^ .2 I 
I (022 - 2R0,, + - ''-"J ' ° 
that is, those values of R such that" 
(4-8) R^(w^ - t^s^c^^) - SRfw^Wg - t^s^c^g) + w| - t^s^Cgg^ 0-
Indeed, the "optimum" Iowa high school (district) size 
appears to be about 1,470 (pupils in ADA) if Equations III 
or IV of Table 4-1.are used, while if Equation V is used, the 
optimum size increases to about 1,5.00. Utilizing formula 
* 
4-8 above, the lower and" upper confidence, limits of Xg = 
1 , 4 7 0  a p p e a r  t o  b e  1 , 2 7 7  a n d  1 , 6 6 3  r e s p e c t i v e l y  ( f o r  a  =  
.05). 
Perhaps some insight may be gained, in our case, when 
we observe the specific relationship between Xg and Xg for 
those districts whose ADA is greater than our "optimum" of 
1,470 (pupils in ADA), The figures are reported in Table 
4-4. 
1 
Note, however, that no correction is made for differ­
ences in quality. Such a correction is called for, in 
particular, for school no. 5 (in Table 4-4), for which we 
have the following information: Yg = 3.9, X^  = 36.07, X/t = 
1.04, Xc = 5,213, X5 = 48.0, and X.q = 3I.OT It seems that 
this school is able to cut per pupil expenditures by offering 
comparatively low salaries and maintaining a large students-
teacher ratio. 
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Table 4-4. Expenditures per pupil and ADA for districts 
whose ADA exceeds i,400 pupils 
School Expenditures 
no. per pupil ADA 
1 353 • 1,449 
2 392 1,557 
3 386 1,571 
4 389 1,825 
5 287 2,913 
6 369 3,308 
- 7 . 346 3,506 
8 444 3,890 
9 447 4,115 
Conclusions 
1. We have presented a method by which a quality 
index could be used in correcting for quality differences 
among high schools. 
2. Significant economies of scale were found to exist 
in Iowa high school operations. Also, diminishing marginal 
returns are found to set in at a certain point. In other 
words, a larger school is likely to be able to spend a 
smaller amount of resources per student for the same quality 
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of education. Other things equal, this seems~to imply that 
consolidation is likely to pay off. However, other things 
do not necessarily remain equal (transportation costs, for 
example, are likely to increase), so that the policy impli­
cations of our results—for the state of Iowa—are limited 
until or unless these other costs are appraised simultaneously 
with money costs to the school districts. 
3. An "optimum" scale size was estimated (for Iowa) to 
be between 1,470 and 1,500 (pupils in average daily attend­
ance).^  The 5 per cent confidence limits associated with the 
estimated optimum of 1,470 pupils are 1,277 and 1,663. How­
ever, the upper limit of 1,663 reflects our use of a second 
degree parabola in this particular equation. A rectangular 
hyperbola, on the other hand, gives an even better fit to 
our data, and we conclude on this and other grounds that 
there may be.no basis for specifying an upper limit to optimal 
school size within the range of our Iowa data. 
T^he average daily attendance figures are for the high 
school alone, not for the school system (including elementary) 
as a whole. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
In Chapter 3, we have stated the fundamental theme to 
be pursued insofar as educational policy-making for high 
schools is concerned. To recapitulate, the educator is 
likely to be interested in maximizing a certain objective 
function of the form 
(5~l) ffX^ * 2^' Z OjXj, j™l* 2, » «, n 
3 
where the are the various factors that have influence 
upon the object to be maximized, namely, school quality. 
(It may well be, however, that something other than school 
quality is to be maximized. In some instances, the school 
board may want to maximize the time available for students 
to help their parents' farming operations with school 
quality as a constraint rather than the objective. Further­
more, the definition of "quality" is almost certain to vary 
between schools, and even within school jurisdictions a 
consensus as to the meaning of quality is not likely to 
exist.) • 
Some of the constraints which must be taken into 
account in the maximization process have also been described 
in Chapter 3. Specifically, we stated the following con­
straints in an illustrative case; 
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1^1^ 1 *12^ 2 1^3^ 3 1^A 1^5^ 5 • • • + &in%n - ®o 
2^ A < 4 
< 35 
(5-2) 
*43*3 < 1,000 
5^4*4 5 25 
It has been pointed out earlier- that any analysis that 
purports to "solve" the maximization problem with its attend­
ant constraints, as in 5-1 and 5-2, must provide the necessary 
objective function weights cj. Chapter 3 analyzed an attempt 
to provide these on the basis of their effects on the dif­
ference between the composite score on the ITED (Iowa Tests 
of Educational Development) for the 12th grade and that for 
the 10th grade. However, the results of that chapter were 
not conclusive. A further analysis of the data, as well as 
the theoretical implications of the' quality models of Chapter 
3, calls for a fundamental change in approach. 
In the first place, Yg (.the change in the ITED scores) 
may not seriously be regarded as the only measure of high 
school quality. Many factors that enhance high school 
quality will, accordingly, have little or no correlation 
with Yg—hence the low explanatory power of the regression 
models of type 3-2 of Chapter 3. For example, the number 
of credit-units offered by the school shows the extent of 
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curriculum breadth which the high school is able and willing 
to offer its students, Hypothetically, the more courses 
that are available for the students from which they can 
choose, the greater the expected quality that will be gen­
erated from the particular high school program. Yet the 
correlation coefficient between Yg and Xg (credit-units 
offered) is only 0.1275. Intuitively, we would expect a 
considerably higher correlation coefficient than this.if 
school administrators who strove to broaden curricula strove 
with equal energy to increase the change in ITED scores. 
Another example may be the size of the "average high 
school class." While there is apparently a controversy 
among educators as•to the relevance of this factor insofar 
as the quality of the educational program of the high school 
is concerned, it seems that, other things equal, a smaller 
class (i.e., a smaller pupils-to-teachers ratio) will enable 
closer contacts between pupils and teachers, and hence will 
permit the teachers to gain more knowledge as to the prog­
ress of each child than would have been the case in a large 
class. 
Moreover, teacher salaries reflect the price of teacher 
services. But it may be necessary to adjust median teachers' 
salaries for a number of factors that will be discussed 
shortly. Therefore, a closer analysis of the factors affect­
ing teachers' salaries is called for. 
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In sum, we ought to devise a new index of quality, one 
that may include Yg, but which, in addition, contains other 
factors on which there exists some consensus among educators 
as to their importance in the determination of school qual­
ity. Specifically, we may formulate a quality index, Q, 
which is a weighted average of' the various school inputs 
which, in our view, reflect school quality: 
(5~3) Q = Zg, .. J Zg) 
where the Z's are defined as follows : 
8S an index of teaching aids, supervisory personnel 
and the design and condition of the plant 
Zg class size (the students-teacher ratio) 
3^ number of college hours per teaching assignment 
Z4 assignments per teacher 
S 
median high school teachers' salary 
^6 S number of credit-units offered 
The Use of Arrow Diagrams 
Our principal hypotheses concerning the ways in which 
various factors affect high school quality are summarized in 
an arrow diagram (Figure 5-1)• Following March and Simon 
(29), a (+) or (-) sign is attached to each arrow denoting 
the nature of the relationship between the two variables 
that are connected by that arrow. For instance, the distance 
of the high school from the "functional economic area" central 
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city is hypothesized to exert some negative influence on 
teachers' salaries, while ADA seems to affect the number of 
units offered in a (strongly) positive manner. 
One may note that"a new variable, call it "aspiration 
level," has been added in Figure $-1. This new factor is a 
subjective one, but presumably, if given a quantitative 
representation, it would help in explaining some of the 
variation in the variables that are used in our quality 
index. Types of empirical information that could, perhaps, 
be used to represent aspiration level are the per cent of 
families in a community with incomes over, say, 10,000 
dollars, the per cent, of adults with more than high school 
education (or with more than four years of college), the 
growth rate of the community, the per cent of families with 
children of school age, and the voting behavior, in recent 
elections, of the populace when the issue was related to 
the public school system (such as a school bond election). 
(See also the Appendix for comments on data refinement.) 
To assist us in determining an appropriate form for 
5-3, a closer analysis of some of its components will be 
made in the following sections. First, a conceptual frame­
work for determining teachers' salaries is presented. Next, 
we analyze in turn the factors that may influence the number 
of credit-units offered, the number of assignments per teach­
er and the number of college hours per teaching assignment. 
ASPIRATION ADA (-) 
(+) (+) ADA 
DISTANCE 
(+) 
ASPIRATION 
{+) (-) 
(+) 
(+) (+) (+) 
(+) 
(-) 
R HIGH ^ 
SCHOOL 
DUALITY 
(+) 
Figure 5-1. Factors affecting high school quality (see text for the definition 
of 2l) 
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In addition, some comments are made concerning class size 
and other factors (the availability of teaching aids, super­
visory personnel, and the condition of the plant). Finally, 
we discuss possible adjustments in variables and the esti­
mation of weights for the "adjusted" quality index. 
Analysis of Teachers' Salaries 
To what extent is the market for teachers similar to 
other labor markets? Intuitively, while we would expect 
teachers to respond to the best alternative that may exist 
in their area of residence, and even, sometime, to move to 
the area in which the most attractive position may be found, 
it is also quite possible that many non-economic factors 
(non-pecuniary in nature) serve to distinguish teachers from 
other (public or private) employees. For example, the fact 
that a large majority of the teachers in the elementary and 
high schools are women, often not the sole family supporters, 
illuminates the point. That is, teachers whose incomes are 
merely supplements to the earnings of the head of the house­
hold may prefer to stay at schools which are near their homes, 
in a familiar community,.rather than travel several miles to 
locations where better job opportunities may exist. Further­
more, some teachers will travel a certain distance away from 
their present home towns to schools with which they have 
traditionally been associated as parents, teachers or pupils, 
even though better opportunities yet exist in their immediate 
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vicinity. Such behavior can easily be explained in terms 
of psychological preference/ which economists must take into 
account. 
The typical teachers' salary schedule is structured on 
the basis of the following elements: (l) the so-called "base 
salary," (2) the number of years of experience the teacher 
has, and (3) the educational background of the teacher. In 
the present context, only the median salary is available, 
while, theoretically, our main Interest lies in explaining 
differences in the base salary (see the Appendix for more 
detail). 
Locational factors in teachers' salaries 
Home-to-work commuting fields in the 1960's are usually 
centered on urban places exceeding 25,000 in population. 
Suppose that one can drive, on the average, a distance of 50 
miles in one hour. Also, assume that few people will drive 
longer than 60 minutes from their homes to'their places of 
work. Then, according to analyses made by Pox (13, pp. 5-8), 
due to the way in which highways have been built in the Mid­
west (loxfâ in particular), a commuting field will cover an 
area of about 5,000 square miles. Such a commuting field 
is called a functional economic area (PEA). Por Iowa, a map 
defining the 12 PEA's has been prepared by Pox and is repro­
duced here as Figure 5-2. 
Suppose, now, that a person is able to make a choice as 
MSAIOIO 423 (S9) 
*oth«»!er(50J8l CD— wkoM 29.6 35.6 ox I iaCfcstêtSJi 78J0 
m Fotrmonl O Auslia 
Albert leo 
KOiTAlO fwiwiitsxiF^  
ol 3.8 Cr««ce o D«c. 6 4 
OSCUlA OICKI) toisu wiNNivao 
OIIIIM MtO Alio HAMCOCK aitoi MOO 
s ts&v 
curiOM lAKIlf o 2^  W.U, POUHO 13 Elk. 
OUIUQUI LiWilE lOCKiM 
CUUUU 
U( ISOM EMiOl CtAWfOtO CtEENE 
» )IK rOWESh KSOM 
rfASKA 
lEFritSOX 
9 3Shen.6^ 
DECATUI AWAMOOSE 
O 4.9 aor. 
o 2J BclKony 
13* Crb 
M M 
-4 
*C*mkol cBics #A betli of rong« «f 
•CAAomSe oc1t«tlhrt lo twr< f j O  Marv. 
Sl.Joteph 
B. 
Figure 5-2. Fifty-mile commuting distances from the central business districts 
of all FEA central cities in or near Iowa. Adapted from Pox (13, 
Figure 8, p. 35) 
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to,where he should reside within a particular PEA. Suppose, 
further, that labor markets are perfectly competitive, and 
that the overriding factor involved in the Individual's 
decision as to the choice of the place to work is dictated 
by economic (i.e., pecuniary) considerations. In addition, 
let the cost of commuting per mile be 5 cents. Therefore, 
if the laborer lives 10 miles away from his workplace, and 
if he works 50 weeks per year, in each of which there are 5 
working days, then the total commuting cost Is $5.00 per 
week, or $250.00 per year (for the daily round trip). 
If all other things remain equal, a rational worker 
will not choose to travel the 10 miles.each way each day 
unless he Is compensated an extra amount of $5.00 per week. 
To sum up, since most of the commuting in a given PEA is 
from the outlying areas to the central city and back, one 
may expect the salaries in the central city to be the highest 
in the particular PEA. Md the further a community is from 
the central city, the less the salary that must be paid to 
workers of the same type and quality.^  
A similar hypothesis may be made with respect to teachers' 
salaries. In general, one would expect the highest salaries 
1 Farm population in Iowa has been declining for more 
than 25 years. Many persons have chosen to continue living 
in small towns or in the open country and to commute fairly 
long distances to central cities in which job opportunities 
are expanding. 
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to be paid to those in the district closest to the center of 
the PEA. Ceteris paribus, the further the district from the 
central city, the lower the salary that we expect the teach­
ers to receive. However, other factors than distance from 
the central city must be taken into account.^  For one thing, 
the educational level of teachers in different districts 
may not be the same. Thus if in one district the average 
number of college hours per teacher is greater than that in 
another district, we would expect a priori that the former 
district will reward its teachers with higher salaries in 
proportion to their educational level. In addition, different 
communities have different levels of aspiration regarding the 
quality of the teaching and supervisory staff. Also, differ­
ent community philosophies prevail as to how much teachers 
•should be paid. Finally, the wealthier communities can afford 
to pay higher wages to their teachers. That is, with the same 
preference function concerning the choice of, say, paying 
higher wages to teachers versus spending a bit more on other 
municipal services, a city which is endowed with more re­
sources will no doubt pay higher wages to teachers than would 
a city which is not as well endowed. 
Let us, then, define the following variables: 
= distance in miles from the high school to the 
nearest PEA central city 
2o = median high school teachers' salary (in dollars) 
in the nearest PEA central city 
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Z_ a median number of school years completed for the 
 ^ population aged 25 years and older 
Zi^  = median family income in the community (in dollars) 
= per cent of families with income over $10,000 
Zg = college hours per high school teaching assign­
ment 
Zj = average daily attendance (ADA) in the high school 
Zg = median high school teachers' salary (in dollars) 
Our basic hypothesis is that the determination of Zg de­
pends on the level of teachers' salary in the PEA central 
city (Zg) and the distance in miles to that city (Z^ ), while, 
at the same time, we must allow for such factors as the 
average number of college hours per teacher (approximately, 
Zg), the community's economic level (Z^ ), and, perhaps, the 
aspiration level of the community (a combination of Zy Z^  ^
and Z^ ). Hence the following model is proposed; 
(5~^ ) Zg = f^ Z^ J 2^.' •••' Zy) 
If an additive multiple regression model is the specific 
form that 5-4 will take, namely, 
(5-5) Zg = a + b^ Z^  + ... + byZy 
then we would expect, on purely theoretical grounds, to find 
the following ; 
bi < 0 
bg^  b^ , .«., by > 0 
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Of course, the factors outlined above may not be additive, 
so that it may well be that 5-4 should take quite a differ­
ent form. 
Empirical findings 
The full set of 375 high schools (districts) cannot be 
used for testing all of the hypotheses made above. This is 
so because data for variables and are available 
only for towns with populations of 2,500 or over. Neverthe­
less, a number of variants of 5-5 were attempted, disregard­
ing, obviously, the three missing variables. Results-of 
these attempts are summarized in Table 5-1. Also, Table 5-2 
gives the simple correlation coefficients for the variables 
included in Table 5-1. 
The results summarized in Table 5-1 suggest that b^  .is 
significantly negative, while both bg and by are (highly) 
significantly greater than zero. Yet, the empirical tests 
have failed to confirm the hypothesis that bg is positive. 
As some of the 375 districts used in this test were farther 
than 50 miles from the central city, it seemed possible that 
their inclusion may have led to the negative finding. However, 
after the data had been so screened as to ignore those schools 
for which Z^  exceeded 50 miles bg was still far from being 
statistically significant. Information on the socio-economic 
conditions prevailing in the school districts was not used in 
the equations reported in Table 5-1. If the full model 5-4 
Table 5-1. 
i 
Factors affecting median teachers' salaries (Based on data for 374 
Iowa high schools, 1961-62)^ 
Standard 
2 error of 
Equation Intercept Zj Zg Zy R P estimate 
I 5,445.92 - 5.12 - 0.0004 0.02? 5.31 603.28 
(380.90) (1.58) (0.0564) 
II 5,019.95 - 1.64 0.0206 0.562 0.187 28.53 552.25 
(352.22) (1.50) (0.0517) (0.065) 
III 4,599.37 - 4.07 - 0.0551 41.08 0.225 35.92 539.32 
(351.48) (1.42) (0.0507) (4.22) 
IV 4,537.23 - 2.11 - 0.0280 30.88 0.359 0.278 35.65 521.21 
(339.88) (1.42) (0.0493) (4.52) (0.068) 
^Numbers in parentheses indicate the standard error of the coefficients. In 
all cases the dependent variable is Zq. 
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Table 5-2. Simple correlation coefficients for the variables 
(and data) of Table 5-1. 
Zl 22 26 7^ 
=8 
Zl 1.0000 • 
Z2 -0.1476 1.0000 
Z6 -0.0921 ' 0.1227 1.0000 
h -0.2655 -0.0063 
> 
0.4308 1.0000 
28 -0.1666 0.0242 0.4549 0.4291 1.0000 
could be tested, it appeared that the negative results with 
respect to bg might be reversed. 
This argument led us to limit the investigation to a 
sample of high schools, all of which are located in towns 
with populations of 2,500 or over. For such towns, informa­
tion on Zy Z}^  and can easily be obtained from the Census 
of Population reports for I960. And since the data for the 
other variables were compiled for the years 196I-62, the 
difference in the time periods in which the two sets of 
statistics were collected need cause us little concern. 
Using this new set of data, relating to only 8l school 
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districts, a number of variants of model 5-4 were tested. 
Some of the results, in all of which ZQ is the dependent 
variable, are summarized in Table 5-3.. Once again,a corre­
lation matrix for variables Z^ , Z^ , ..., Zq is presented in 
Table 5-4. 
While highest is given by Equation VII of Table 5-3 
and the lowest standard error of estimate» by Equation VI, 
it seems that little is lost (in terms of the reduction in 
and the increase in standard error of estimate) when 
Equation IV is used. 
A 
The predicted value of Zg, Zg', for any specific school 
district, using Equation IV of Table 5-3, is given by 
Zg' = 4,191.01 - 3.68 Z^' + 0.04 Zg' + 39.83 Zg' 
+ 0.117 Zj 
where the apostrophes 'denote a specific value of Z.. Confi-
A , 
dence intervals for Zg are given by 
where tg is the tabulated value of t for probability level 
1 -o (and the appropriate degrees of freedom); s^  = error 
mean square; and where 
s2(Zq') = 8% (1 + 2 + 2 2 2 c. z ' z ') 
o n 1=1 1 i<j 1 J 
Also, the following notation is adopted (2, pp. 202-203): 
Table 5-3. Factors affecting median teachers' salaries (Based upon data for 8l 
Iowa high schools in cities with populations over 2,500)^ 
Equation - Intercept 
^1 Z2 Z3 
=4 
^5 
I 4,043.17 
(392.70) 
0.327 
(0.070) 
II 4,731.48. 
(839.86) 
-3.54^ 
(6.50) 
0.214 
(0.165) 
28.10 
(31.18) 
III 4,202.06 
(334.40) 
IV 4,191.01 
(645.06) 
- 3.68 
(2.47) 
0.040 
(0.085) 
V 5,017.45, 
(1,108.83) 
- 3.91. 
(3.38) 
0.0531 
(0.099) 
- 3.61 
(6.67) 
0.114 ' 
(0.188) 
,31.67^ 
. (31.49) 
VI 3,823.54 
(806.59) 
- 0,05 
(5.75) 
0.090 -
(0.151) 
15.26 
(28.01) 
VII 3,803.77 
(1,029.95) 
- 0.82 
(3.08) 
0.028 
(0.087) 
-0.37, 
(5.95) 
0.073 
(0.168) 
,15.83; 
(28.53) 
^Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors of the coefficients. In all 
cases the dependent variable is Zg. 
Table 5-3. (Continued) 
Equation R F 
Standard 
error of 
estimate 
I 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
43.15, ( 9.80) 
,39.831 
( 9.98) 
,35.36 
(10.30) 
34.98 
(10.46) 
0.l4l 
(0.041) 
0.117 
(0.044) 
0.118 
(0.043) 
0.115 
(0.045) 
0.212 
0.221 
0.379 
0.400 
0.239 
0.424 
0.426 
21.28 
7.31 
23.87 
12.70 
4.73 
11.06 
7.73 
487.17 
490.43 
435.04 
433.21 
491.17 
427.37 
432.60 
Table 5-4. Simple correlation coefficients for the variables (and data) of 
Table 5-3 
'8 
3^ 
S 
6^ 
Zy 
Z8 
1.0000 
-0.1635 1.0000 
-0.2846 0.2598 1.0000 
-0.6727 0.1708 0.5222 1.0000 
-0.5637 0.1872 0.5421 0.9018 1.0000 
-0.3061 0.1419 0.1974 0.3689 0.4111 1.0000 
-0.4366 0.0598 0.0427 0.3726 0.2875 0.3496 1.0000 
-0.3944 0.1383 0.2082 0.4607 0.4507 0.5339 0.4750 1.0000 
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n = number of observations (in our case, n = Bl) 
r = number of independent variables (r « 4, in 
Equation IV) 
I „ t _ t 
"i " i^ " ^ i 
0,, is the element of the ith row and jth column of the 
I -1 
symmetric matrix C = (z'z)' which, in the case of Equation 
IV is: 
10 -7 
327.50 
1.49 0.3900 
218.42 -4.7531 5,308.80 
2.16 0.0078 - 5.96 0.103 
In Tables 5-1 and 5-3 we note that the regression co­
efficients relating Zg to Zg are of the same order of mag­
nitude ($30 to $40) for the 8l largest high schools as for 
the entire set of 375. On the other hand, the regression 
coefficients of Zg upon Zy are much higher in Table 5-1 than 
in Table 5-3. This would seem to imply that Zg and Zy are 
not linearly related. That is, the greater the ADA, the 
less the associated increase in Zg will be for a given in­
crease in ADA. 
To shed some additional light on this phenomenon, a 
quadratic term for Zy has been added to the model giving us 
the following results (for 375 districts): 
Zn = 4421.96 - 1.88Zn + 22.59Zf + I.137Z7 - O.OOO228Z 
° (131.72) (1.38) (4.71) (0.183)' (0.000050) 
(5-6) (R^  = 0.315, P = 42.51) 
1 
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As the quadratic component is significantly negative, 
the results do tend to support the assertion made above. 
A comparison of Tables 5-2 and 5-4 shows a great deal 
of variation in the values of the various correlation co­
efficients." In particular, the one between Zq and Z^ , call 
it rg^ , is -0.17 for the full data set, while it is about 
-0.39 for the smaller sample (of 8l). Further, given the 
root mean squares for Zg and for each of the sets, we 
can calculate the regression coefficient, bgj follows: 
"81 = "^ 81 • V^ i 
where Sg and s^  are the respective root mean squares of Zg 
and Z^ . 
Our calculation of bg^  for the two data sets reveals 
that for the full set bg^  = - $5.12 per mile per year, 
while for the smaller sample, bg^  = - $9.64 per mile per 
year. Assuming that each teacher is required to come to 
work on l80 days each year (l80 "contract days"), and 
assuming that these are the only days which are taken into 
account (i.e., excluding special trips for P.T.A. meetings, 
special seminars and the like), then, on the average, bg^  = 
- 2.8 cents per mile per day for the round trip, or - 1.4 . 
cents per mile each way for the full set (375 observations), 
while for the small sample the figures are 5.4 cents and 
2.7 cents respectively. 
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Let us suppose further that, on the average, one gallon 
of gasoline costs 34 cents. If, on the average, one could 
expect to get 15 miles per gallon under normal driving 
conditions, then the cost of gasoline per mile is approxi­
mately 2.2 cents. 
The coefficients of obtained from both data sets 
would be .consistent with a sophisticated view of commuting 
costs, including wear and tear, costs of maintenance, and 
the like. But the standard errors of these coefficients are 
sufficiently large that we should not claim very much for 
these results. 
In an attempt to gauge the differences in behavior be­
tween (l)-smaller and larger communites and (2) towns which 
are nearer the PEA central city and those which are, say, 
30 miles away from it, the full data set was divided into 
four categories as described in Table 5-5. (Set 1 contains 
all of the districts whose populations exceed 5,000 but 
which are located not farther than 30 miles from the nearest. 
FEA central city. Set 2 is similar to Set 1, but includes 
districts that are located within a radius of more than 30 
miles from the PEA center. Sets 3 and 4 resemble Sets 1 and 
2, respectively, except that they contain districts with 
populations up to and including 5,000.) 
Table 5-6 summarizes the results of two multiple re­
gression models for each of the four sets. The coefficients. 
Table 5-5» Averages of teachers' salaries, ADA, distance from PEA central city 
and other variables (for 374 districts, 1961-62) 
Districts' populations 
No. of districts 
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3Set 4 Total 
less than 2,5Q0 
2,500 - 5,000 
5,000 - 10,000 
10,000 - 50,000 
over 50,000 
Total 
O O 
13 
19 
6 
38 
36 
13 
68 
42 
0 
0 
97 
80 
o 
49 110 177 
165 
122 
49 
32 
6 
374 
Table 5-5. (Continued) 
Means and standard deviations^  
Variables Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 All sets 
Distance ,11.97" 
(11.25) 
1 
48.87 
(15.17) 
22.06 
(14.95) 
47.47 
(13.29) 
36.68 . 
(19.85) 
ADA 1,069.21 
(1,062.59) 
466.20 
(244.10) 
149.32 
(62.24) 
156.78 
(73.70) 
287.79 
(450.56) 
Median salary- 5,920.57 
(551.73) 
5,608.88 
(501.46) 
5,100.08 
(594.31) 
5,111.13 
(523.04) 
5,255.46 
(610.20) 
Salary of 
central city-
6,600.01 
(466.59) 
6,361.48 
(654.24) 
6,602.01 
(615.73) 
6,438.50 
(563.40) 
6,492.81 
(558.57) 
College hours 35.72 
(5.79) 
33.18^  
(4.67) 
26.89 
(6.10) 
26.28 
(5.86) 
28.31 
(6.66) 
Assignments per 
teacher 
1.30 
(0.34) 
1.49 
(0.38) 
2.51 
(0.56) 
2.42 
(0.54) 
2.21 
(0.68) 
Units offered 49.68 
(18.14) 
41.76 
(6.81) 
29.73 
(4.58)' 
29.90 
(5.30) 
33.41 
(10.18) 
N^umbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations of variables. 
Table 5-6. The relationship between median teachers' salaries, distance from PEA 
central city, and other factors (4 data sets described in Table 5-5)^  
Equation Intercept 2i Zg Z6 7^ p 
standard 
error of 
estimate 
I 
Set 1 
2,283.13 
(1,116.51) 
" 3.77^  (7.20) 
0.29 
(0.15) 
43.60 
(13.10) 
0.15 
(0.08) 
0.479 7.60 421.36 
Set 2 
4,685.01 
( 903.86 
- 3.46 
(4.61) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
18.70 
(17.01) 
0.74 
(0.32) 
0.269 4.05 447.75 
Set 3 
4,076.92 
( 735.57) 
- 2.98 
(3.79) 
0.10 
(0.11) 
6.18 
( 9.48) 1.67 (0.91) 0.053 1.49 588.98 
Set 4 
5,387.57, 
( 452.85) 
- 6.50 
(2.80) 
- 0.15 
(0.06) 
30.83 ( 6.63) 1.21 (0.53) 0.184 9.72 477.80 
II 
Set 1 
6,117.46 
( 125.66) 
- 16.44 
(7.69) 
0.112 4.56 526.90 
Set 2 
5,984.79, 
( 239.70) 
- 7.69 
(4.68) 
0.054 2.69 492.85 
Set 3 
5,161.80 
( 101.52) 
- 2.79, 
(3.81) 
0.005 0.53 595.58 
Set 4 
5,228.58 
( 146.28) 
- 2.47 
(2.96) 
0.004 0.69 523.49 
'^Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors of coefficients. 
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bg^ , range from - 2.4? dollars to - l6.44 dollars, or from 
1.4 to 9.2 cents per roundtrip mile, or 0.7 to 4.6 cents per 
actual mile traveled. All of these coefficients have the 
expected sign; however, their standard errors are substan­
tial. 
Before we close this section, a number of cautions 
must be made. In the first place, this analysis is based 
on median high school teachers' salaries. More appropri­
ately, account should be taken of (l) the base salary, (2) 
the increments that may be obtained each year, regardless 
of improvement in the- educational background of the teacher, 
and (3) the increments that a teacher may receive for a . . 
greater amount of education. In such a framework, the 
"distance hypothesis" should be tested with respect to the 
base salary alone, thus correcting immediately for differ­
ences in the average educational background of the teachers. 
Second, represents the distance in miles with no 
regard to the quality of the road, the amount of traffic on 
the road, and to weather conditions in the particular area. 
In' other words, if time rather than miles is the constraint 
on commuting, one must take into account the variation from 
area to area in the driving time per mile. 
Finally, it must be noted that at best we were able to 
explain about 48 per cent of the variation in Zq. This 
suggests that other variables and data refinements, some of 
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which have already been mentioned, should if possible be 
included in future models. Also, the coefficients of do 
not appear to be highly (statistically) significant in any 
of the models. Consequently, any conclusions drawn from 
this study must be highly tentative at best. 
The Rank-Size Rule 
Both curriculum breadth and teacher's specialization 
are generally regarded as components of quality. Holding 
ADA constant, and assuming that each student has time for 
a specified number of courses, it is clear that the average 
class size will decrease proportionately with an increase 
in the number of courses offered. Hence, if some minimum 
expected enrollment is required before a new course is 
offered (say 25 students), there must be, first, a certain 
increase in ADA before the demand for a new course will be 
recognized. Furthermore, an increase in ADA will also per­
mit an increase in specialization (i.e., a reduction in the 
number of courses taught per teacher). 
Put another way, we may assume that the students (or 
their parents) possess implicit indifference maps relating 
the number of units offered and the average quality per 
course which may be regarded as a function of the number of 
assignments per teacher. In other words, given a certain 
level of enrollment (ADA), a choice can be made between more 
courses but with less "quality" and fewer courses but with 
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better "quality." Furthermore, the specific level of ADA 
will define a "budget constraint" in that additional courses 
can be offered—other things, such as the number of teachers, 
remaining the same—only at the expense of their quality. 
In principle, an "expansion path" which is the locus of the 
equilibrium points for each level of ADA may be derived (l8, 
pp. 12-22). That is, a maximization process is assumed to 
produce demand curves for both the number of courses and 
the degree of specialization as functions of the number of 
pupils in ADA. 
Credit-units offered 
Assuming that such demands for courses which are not 
currently offered by a given school are recognized by the 
school administration, it will be interesting to attempt a 
reproduction of such demands. To give a specific form to 
the distribution of latent demands and actual enrollments, 
we will assume that they, follow the rank-size rule. (The 
distribution may be assumed contingent on teaching of uni­
form quality in the various courses.) It must be emphasized, 
however, that we have no clear justification for applying 
the rank-size rule to either the number of units offered or 
to the number of assignments per teacher (in the next sub­
section) . 
Using the rank-size rule which is described by Brian 
J. L. Berry (6, pp. 76-77), we may formulate the following 
137 
hypothesis. Let P„ denote the population of a city of rank 
r, where all cities are ranked from largest to smallest. 
(Thus the largest city will.have rank r = 1, and = P^ .) 
Then we expect to find that 
P^  • 1 = Pg • 2 =» ... =s Pj, '• r = constant 
In other words, 
where q is an exponent which generally approximates unity. 
Soj if q = Ij 
(5-7) Pj. = P/r 
Let us redefine P and r to conform to the problem at 
hand. Specifically, we denote the total enrollment of any 
particular class (including the number of different sections 
of the same subject matter) in the high school curriculum by 
P^ , where r refers to the enrollment rank of that particular 
class. Thus, if the largest enrollment obtains in the first 
semester English course, its rank, r, will be 1, and its 
enrollment will be P^ . 
Suppose that the rank-size rule applies to the number 
of courses offered in the high school. If there are 40 dif­
ferent one-semester courses (in a specific high school) and 
the enrollment in the smallest (P^Q) 25, then 
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P40 = = 25 
Hence it follows that = 1,000. Following this rule for 
all r = 1, 2, ,40, Table 5-7 obtains. 
Let us now assume that the minimum class enrollment is 
to be 25, that the total enrollment (in all courses) amounts 
to 10,000 student-courses per year, and that the number of 
courses, n, is undetermined. Given that the rank-size rule 
applies, what can we say about n? 
First, total enrollment is simply 
n n p n 
Z  P L  =  2 _ i L = p ,  =  1 0 , 0 0 0  
r=l r r=l r 1 r=i r 
Taking logarithms, we have 
(5-8) log Pi + log Z ^  = log 10,000 
r=l 
We also Imow that P^  = 25. Utilizing formula 5-7, 
n^ ~ and P^ /n = 25 
Therefore, 
(5-9) log P_i_ = log 25 ,+ log n 
Combining the results of 5-8 and 5-9 it is clear that 
n  ^
(5-10) log n + log 2 — = log 10,000 - log 25 = 2.60206 
r=l  ^
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Table 5-7. Rank-size distribution of one-semester course 
enrollments (n = 40, = 25) 
Rank (r) Size (Pp) Rank (r) Size (Pp) 
1 1,000 • 21 48 
2 500 22 45 
3 333 23 44 
4 250 24 42 
5 200 25 40 
6 167 26 38 
7 143 27 37 
8 125 28 36 
9 111 29 34 
10 100 30 33 
11 •91 31 32 
12 83 32 31 
13 77 33 30 
14 .71 34 29 
15 67 35 29 
16 63 36 28 
17 59 37 27 
18 56 38 26 
19 53 39 26 
20 50 40 25 
41 24 
Ranks Total enrollment 
• 
1-10 2,929 
11-20 770 
21-30 397 
31-40 283 
1-40 4,379 
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The solution of 5-10 will give us one positive value of 
n. For example, if total enrollment is 10,132 and = 25, 
n 
it can be shoivn that n = 80, the sum of the series 2 1 = 
r=l r 
5.0, and P-[_ = 2,000. A simple Illustration of this case is 
provided by Table 5-9. 
It seems intuitively obvious that total enrollment and 
the average daily attendance (ADA) should be directly re­
lated. For the purposes of this section, we may assume that 
there are two semesters per year, and that every student 
takes, on the average, five courses per semester. In other 
words, if ADA = 100, total enrollment = lOADA = 1,000 stu­
dent courses per year. 
Suppose, then, that total enrollment = 10ADA and that 
the rank-size rule, applies. VJhat would the effect of an 
increase in ADA be on n, the number of courses offered? 
Further, if ADA increases, what per cent of this increase 
will involve increased enrollment in previously-offered 
courses and in the newly-offered ones? 
If = 1,000, and n increases from 40 to 4l, it can 
be shown that 
n 
log 2 -1-
r=l  ^
:  = 0.222 
log n 
On the other hand, if Pj = 1,000, and n increases from 80 to 
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Table 5-8, ' Rank Size Distributions when n = 80 and P-i = 
1,000 
Rank (i) Size Rank (i) Size (P^ ) 
4l 24 • 61 16 
42 24 62 16 
43 23 63 16 
44 23 64 16 
45 22 65 15 
46 22 66 15 
47 21 67 15 
48 21 68 15 
49 20 69 14 
50 20 70 14 
51 20 71 l4 
52 19 72 14 
53 19 73 14 
54 19 74 .• 14 
55 18 75 13 
56 18 • 76 13 
57 18 77 13 
58 17 78 13 
59 17 79 13 
60 17 80 12 
Ranks Total enrollment 
1-40 4,379 (see Table 5-7) 
41-50 220 
51-60 182 
61-70 152 
71-80 133 
1-80 5,066 
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Table 5-9. Rank-size distribution when n = 80 and Pj^  = 25 
Rank Size Rank Size Rank Size Rank Size 
1 2,000 21 96 41 48 61 32 
2 1,000 22 90 42 48 62 32 
3 666 23 88 43 46 63 32 
4 500 24 84 44 46 64 32 
5 400 25 80 45 44 65 30 
6 334 26 76 46 44 66 30 
7 246 27 74 47 42 67 30 
8 250 28 72 48 42 68 30 
9 222 29 68 49 40 69 28 
10 200 30 66 . 50 40 70 • 28 
11 182 31 64 51 40 71 28 
12 166 32 62 52 38 72 28 
13 154 33 60 53 38 73 28 
14 142 34 58 54 38 74 28 
15 134 35 58 55 36 75 26 
16 126 36 56 56 36 76 26 
17 118 37 54 57 36 77 26 
18 112 38 52 58 34 78 26 
19 106 39 52 59 34 79 26 
20 100 40 50 60 34 80 24 
81 24 
Ranks Total enrollment Ranks Total enrollment 
1-10 5,858 41-50 440 
11-20 1,540 51-60 364 
21-30 794 61-70 304 
31-40 , 566 71-80 266 
1-40 8,758 41-80 1,374 
1-80 10,132 
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8l> it can also be shown that (see also Table 5-8) 
log Z ^  
^ « 0.1889 
log n 
It appears, therefore, that in the range of n « 40 to n « 
n 
80 log 2 — increases about 0.222 to O.I89 times as fast 
r=l r 
as log n. 
Suppose, once again, that = 25. If n « 80, = 
25n = 2,000. And if n increases to 8I, P^  will increase to 
2,025. But if enrollment was 10,000 at n = 80, it is now 
10,125 + 25 = 10,150. That is, when n increases by 1.25 
per cent, enrollment in P^  goes up by 1.25 per cent and 
similarly for all previously existing courses. Also, 25 
students take course n + 1 (=8l). So, if ADA goes up by 
1.50 per cent (since ADA = l/lO of total enrollment, ADA of 
1,000 allows n to be 80; for n to increase to 81, enrollment 
must increase to 10,150, so ADA must increase to 1,015—an 
increase of 1.5 per cent), n goes up by 1.25, per cent but 
only 0.25 per cent of total enrollment (I/6 of the increase) 
is in the new course. Roughly, then, a one per cent increase 
in ADA would lead to about O.83 per cent increase in the 
number of courses offered and O.17 per cent increase in the 
n 
sum of the series % A. . 
r=l r . 
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To sum up, if the rank-size rule applies and if a new 
course must have a minimum expected enrollment of 25/ then 
l^(n) - 25 n, = 25(n + l), so that = 
l^(n) 25. Further, enrollment in all courses 1, 2, 
n goes up in the ratio 
. .. .5 
p p 
l(n) l(n) 
so that total enrollment in courses 1 through n' increases 
by 25/P . , per cent. Finally, the actual number of stu-
ilnj ' 
dents in these courses increases by 
n 
2 5  = 2 5  2 —  =  —  2 P  
P^  r=l  ^  ^r=l  ^
so that the change in total enrollment is 
2 Pr + 25 
r=l 
An interesting result of this analysis follows. Since 
n^+1 becomes a gradually declining proportion of the change 
in total enrollment as n increases, if costs per pupil re­
main constant, the relative cost of adding one new course 
becomes a smaller and smaller percentage of total resources 
as ADA increases. Moreover, if—as the analysis of Chapter 
4 clearly shows—the costs per pupil decline with increased 
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enrollment (ADA), the relative costs of adding an additional 
course become smaller yet. 
Finally, we must note that for large changes in n dif­
ferent results will be obtained. For instance, if n changes 
from n = 40 to n =» 41, given that = 25, enrollment in 
courses 1 through 40 goes up by 109.5, and 25 students are 
added to course 4l—so the total change in enrollment is 
134.5. In other words, of a one per cent rise in ADA, O.I86 
per cent would go into the new course and the rest would go 
into existing courses. Similarly, it can be shown that when 
n increases from 80 to 8I, O.165 of each one per cent incre­
ment in enrollment would go into the new course. But if n 
increases from 40 to 80 (where ADA rises,, roughly, from 438 
to 1,013), about 25 per cent of the increase in enrollment 
would go into courses 4l through 80, while 75 per cent would 
be channeled into previously existing courses. 
Empirical findings 
So far we have concentrated our efforts on the theoret­
ical analysis regarding enrollment,'ADA, and the number of 
units offered. What is, then, the actual relationship be­
tween ADA and the number of units offered? If we denote 
,the number of units offered by Xg (as in .Chapter 3), then a 
number of multiple regression models can be-tested v/ith 
as the dependent variable and ADA as the sole or most impor­
tant indopendeni; variable. Specifically, the following 
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models have been tested (on the basis of 374 districts): 
(5-11) = 28.19 + O.OI8IADA 
(0.37) (0.0007) 
(R2 = 0.644, P = 675.82) 
(5-12) XfT = 32.63 + O.OI78ADA - 0.0107X9 
° (2.24) (0.0007) (0.0053) 
(r2 = 0.648, P = 342.68) 
where Xg = total school expenditures per pupil in ADA 
(5-13) X. = 24.77 + 0.03555ADA - 0.00000549404.2 
o (0.44) (0.0016) (0.00000048) 
/ 
r2 = 0.738, P = 523.79), 
When ADA = 1,000 (as we assumed above), we can calculate 
Xg in Equations 5-II and 5-13. Also, we can use an equation 
such as Equation I of Table 4-2 to determine the value of Xg 
corresponding to ADA = 1,000. Then the value of Xg can also 
be calculated for Equation 5-12 (when ADA = 1,000). Using 
these numerical substitutions for Xg, Xg and ADA, we get, 
first, using Equation 5-11: 
(5-14) dXg/dADA = 0.01814 
dX^  ADA 
—: . = 0.429 
dADA Xg 
Similarly, for 5-12 and 5-13 we get, respectively, 
(5-15) 3xy 6ADA = 0.0178 
14? 
Ë . ADA  ^0.373 
aADA Xg 
(5-16) dXg 
= 0.0335 - O.OOOOllADA = 0.0225 
dXg • ADA 
= 0.405 
dADA Xg 
In summary, the empirical results, using the Iowa data, show 
that, for ADA =, 1J300, a one per cent increase in ADA is 
associated with an increase in the number of courses offered 
of between 0.3^ 3 and 0.43 per cent. (We note that in 
Equation 5-12 total expenditures per pupil were hel^ d con­
stant while ADA v;as allowed to vary. Also, a quadratic 
component was added to the linear relationship of 5-11 in 
Equation 5-13, and as a result the outcomes of 5-lG are 
quite different from those in 5-14 and 5-15.) 
Divergence between empirical and hypothetical 
The above results do not conform to the hypothetical 
formulations made above, where we expected the per cent 
increase in Xg to be about 0.83 of one per cent for each 
one per cent increase in ADA. However, it must be realized 
that there are tremendous pressures on even the smallest 
148 
high school to offer as many different units as possible. 
In the first place, the State Department of Public Instruc­
tion sets a standard of minimum number (and types) of units 
that each school should offer. Too great a deviation from 
the standard for too many years, may cost a school its 
accreditation by the state concerned. Or a school may not 
be given"accreditation until and unless it satisfies the 
minimum standard for number of units offered. Second, the 
community may put political and economic pressures on the 
high school principal to add more courses, even though the 
demand for these is far below the 25 limit set above. In 
particular, since many believe that a high school that does 
not offer a certain number of courses is necessarily infe­
rior, and that, as a consequence, the graduates from that 
school may find it difficult to go to college or find good 
Jobs after graduation, they will put great emphasis, on the 
number of courses offered. 
With limited resources, small enrollment, and great 
pressure to, add more and new courses, the high school prin­
cipal will be led, so it seems, to force his teachers to 
assume a greater burden by teaching, on the average, two 
to three assignments.. Further, classes in many subjects 
will be quite small, implying high costs per pupil in these 
courses. Consequently, a deterioration of the quality of 
each course is almost inevitable. First, many a course will 
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be taught by a teacher who is not competent in that subject 
matter. Second, to keep total per pupil costs dov/n, some 
cuts in spending that would not have otherwise been made 
(for a more limited curriculum) will likely lower the 
quality of those courses for which demand exceeds 25. In 
all, while the number of courses offered may not.conform 
to the theoretical requirements of the rank-size rule, it 
may well be true that the number of courses, divided by a 
certain index of quality,'would. That is to say, increased 
enrollment may not increase the units offered by much, but 
courses that were previously offered but which were of poor 
quality (and hence should not really count as "full" courses) 
may now be improved. 
Assignments per teacher (X4) 
The rank-size rule which we have explored to some extent 
in the previous section can be of some additional utility in 
explaining the theoretical variations among schools in the 
average number of different assignments per teacher. 
Suppose, once more, that the rank-size rule applies. 
Further, let us assume that the student-teacher ratio is 
constant at 25 to 1 (in fact, the mean student-teacher ratio 
for the 375 Iowa high schools is 20.81, and the standard 
deviation is 12.75). Then, utilizing the results already 
obtained in the previous section. Table 5-10 can be construct-
Table 5-10. A comparison of the theoretical and empirical results concerning the 
average number of assignments per teacher^  
I. A hypothetical case 
Total enrollment No. of teachers 
in courses of ranks No. of in courses of ranks 
ADA 1-20 21-40 41-80 teachers 1-20 21-40 41-80 
185 1,850 0 0 7.4 7.4 0.0 0.0 
438 3,700 679 0 17.5 14.8 2.7 0.0 
1,013 7,400 1,358 1,374 40.5 29.6 5.4 5.5 
ADA 
No. of 
courses No. of 
Courses 
per 
teacher 
(X4) A ADA J offered teachers A M)A A ADA 
185 20 7.4 2.7 — — - -
438 40 17.5 2.3 -0.4 253 -0.00154 -0.11 
1, 013 80 40.5 2.0 -0.3 575 -0.00052 -0.09 
P^or further details consult the text. 
Table 5-10• (Continued) 
II. Empirical (for the 378 Iowa high schools, 1961-62, Table 3-4 above) 
A X 
ADA A^DA Xj^  . A X2^   ^ADA ADA 
120 — . 2.65 . — — — 
200 80 2.19 -0.46 -0.00575 -0.25 
382 182 1.58. -0.61 -0.00335 -0.30 
1,178 796 1.20 -0.38 -0.00047 -0.11 
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ed. It appears, then, that (on theoretical grounds) a one 
per cent change in enrollment would be expected to produce 
about one-tenth of one per .cent change (in the opposite 
direction) in the number of courses (assignments) per 
teacher. On the other hand, if the student-teacher ratio 
were constant at 20 to 1 (rather than 25 to l), the expected 
percentage change in a given one per cent change in 
ADA would be about 0.18 for the ADA range of 185 to 438, and 
0.096 for the ADA range of 438 to 1,013. 
Next, consider the four sets of data that were used in 
the construction of Table 3-4 (of Chapter 3). In Table 5-10 
the mean value of ADA for each of the sets is recorded, to­
gether with the applicable mean value of X4. Prom these 
basic figures,, it appears that a one per cent increase in 
ADA, in the range of ADA = 120 to ADA = 200, would result in 
about one-fourth of one per cent decrease in Xij.. In the 
range of ADA = 200 to ADA = 382, the•percentage change would 
go up to - 0.30, while for the last range (382 to 1,178) the 
figure would be - 0.11 per cent. 
While some similarities exist between the theoretical 
and the empirical results, especially for the large-ADA 
group, we must still reconcile the differences that exist 
for the smaller-ADA groups (in which the percentage change 
in Xi| differs by about 0.1 to 0.2 per cent). In fact, it 
seems that on the basis of the arguments made in the previous 
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section the actual change in should be greater than that 
which would be generated by the rank-size rule. For if it 
is true that smaller schools over-extend themselves inso­
far as the number of units offered is concerned, they must 
compensate for this by having a greater than optimal 
number of courses per teacher. So when ADA increases, up 
/ 
to a certain point, much of the change in ADA will be 
associated with the reformulation of the policies regarding 
while the change in the number of courses will not be 
of much import (as these were already above their optimal 
level), To sum up, for the low ranges of ADA, a one per 
cent change in ADA is expected to produce quite a large 
change in —more than we would have expected if schools 
were to behave precisely according to the rank-size rule. 
But once the optimal level of is restored, changes in ADA 
will have the expected impact on X2| (and, consequently, also 
the expected theoretical impact on the number of courses 
offered). 
In addition to the empirical results outlined above, 
some regression models were tested, some of which are repro­
duced below (for the 374 Iowa schools): 
(5-17) X,, = 2.432 - 0.00075ADA 
4 (0.036) (0.00006) 
(R^  = 0.25, P = 124.56) 
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(5-18) log Xh = 1.130 - 0.3531ogADA 
 ^ (0.029) (0.012) 
(R2 = 0.67, F = 745.22) 
(5-19) Xh = 2.80 - O.OO266ADA + 0.000000604ADA2 
 ^ (0.04) (0.00015) (0.000000044) 
(R2 = 0.50, F = 185.77) 
(5-20) X., = 1.45 + 0.0023X3 - O.OOO69OADA 
 ^ (0.21) (0.0005) (0.000067) 
(where Xg = expenditures per pupil) 
(r2 = 0.29, F = 76.64) 
These equations are self-explanatory. From Equation 5-18 
it is immediately obvious that, on the average, a one per 
cent change in ADA will produce about 0.35 per cent change 
in X^ j.. Further, when we substitute in the other models 
the mean values for ADA and Xjj^  (that is, 287.83 and 2.21, 
respectively), the per cent changes in X^  ^for a one per 
cent change in ADA are 0.097, O.3O and O.O89 for models 
5-17, 5-19 and 5-20 respectively. 
Furthermore, both 5-18 and 5-19 indicate the nature of 
non-linearity involved in the relationship between X^ j, and 
ADA (note that in both cases the "fit" is much better than 
in 5-17 and 5-20; also, the quadratic term in 5-I9 is highly 
significant, and it adds a very significant amount of ex­
planatory power (R^ ) over and above that of the linear . 
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term). TKe "nature of the relationship depicted in 5-19 is 
consistent with the argument made above. That is, for small 
enrollment (ADA), a change in ADA will exert an important 
influence on (so as to achieve an optimal allocation of 
teachers' talents). As ADA increases, the strength of the • 
(positive) quadratic term will be greater and greater, thus 
diminishing continuously the influence that a one per cent • 
change in ADA would have on (since by then, according to 
the rank-size rule, much of the change in ADA would result 
in the introduction of new courses, leaving the number of 
assignments per teacher approximately constant). 
Finally, in Equation 5-20 .an attempt was made to examine 
the effects of a change in ADA on X^  ^ when expenditures per 
pupil (Xg) are held constant. And while the results of 5-20 
indicate that such a model Is empirically useful (it cer­
tainly is from the theoretical point of view), yet it does 
not change the results of 5-17 by much, and thus the inclu­
sion of Xg in models such as 5-18 or 5-19 does not seem to 
be quantitatively important. 
The Quality Model 
So far we have analyzed three of the "quality variables" 
which are to be included in the index, Q, of 5-1 and 5-3. 
And while we do not claim to exhaust all of the possibili­
ties, it seems that in addition to X/j^ , X^  and Xg (see defi­
nition in Chapter 3), one should include (l) college hours 
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per teaching assignment, (2) the class size (student-teacher 
ratio); and (3) some index of the quality of. teaching-aids, 
supervisory personnel, and the condition of the "plant." 
College hours per teaching assignment (Xg) 
The basic hypothesis is that a richer educational back­
ground will necessarily result in increased school quality, 
other things being equal. Our empirical investigations show 
that Xg is significantly correlated with X^ , Xg, Xg and X^ j., 
About 38 per cent of the variation in X^  can be "explained" 
in terms of these variables in the following equation (for 
375 schools): 
(5-21) X _ = 21.75 - 2.83X2, + 0.00204Xc + 0.0085X6 
' (3.56) (0.59)4 (0.00054)5 (0.0550)° 
+ 0.0078X8 - 0.00000158X0% 
(0.0027) • (0.00000064)° 
(r2 = 0.379, P = 45.04) 
In simple words, schools that are willing to pay higher 
salaries can expect to attract better educated teachers (or, 
conversely, better educated teachers can successfully demand 
higher wages). Also, schools in which X^  is greater would 
tend to have (l) greater enrollment—although the effects 
of ADA diminish as ADA rises—and (2) fewer different sub­
ject matter assignments per teacher. The latter phenomenon 
can be explained, on the one hand, in the context of the 
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rank-size rule applied above. But one may note, "Onthe 
other hand, that this may be due to the fact that the more 
educated teachers will tend to specialize in specific sub­
jects so that they will get the chance to concentrate their 
efforts on the fields in which their competence is greatest. 
Put another way, schools that are in the market for teach­
ers with more education are also (on the average) more 
interested in enabling their teachers to become more spec­
ialized and, presumably, more competent. 
Class size (X20)  ^ , 
As stated earlier (in Chapter 2), the relevance of 
class size to high school quality is quite a controversial 
topic among educators. It seems, however, that a tutorial 
system (with relatively small classes) is the best form of 
education. At the same time, classes that are somewhat 
larger can be equally effective if the distribution of 
students according to levels of intelligence is such that 
competition will be encouraged. Beyond a certain point, 
the increase in class size will, we believe, lead to the 
deterioration of quality. Table 5-11 presents a number of 
indices which take these considerations into account. Many 
other possible indices could, of course, be constructed. 
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Table 5-11. Qualify indices for average class size (X^ o) 
Indices 
Class size (l) ' (2) (3) 
1-5 10 15 15 
6-10 9 15 15 
11-15 8 10 15 
16-20 7 7 10 
21-25 6 5 5 
26-30 5 4 4 
31-35 4 3 3 
36-40 3 2 2 
40 and over 2 1 1 
Other factors 
The availability of teaching aids, supervisory person­
nel, secretarial and clerical help, as well as the condition 
of the plant, would seem to be quality variables of some 
significance. While it is not the purpose of this study to 
examine these matters, it would be desirable to assess the 
value of such things as educational television, programmed 
studies, speech and language laboratories, and the like, in 
improving the quality of the high school program. Further, 
it is beyond doubt that the quality and availability of non-
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teaching personnel (including clerical and secretarial 
help) would have some bearing upon the final quality of 
the high school program. As far as buildings and equipment 
are concerned, it would seem that better facilities would. 
encourage and stimulate better learning and provide, on 
the whole, a more cheerful atmosphere. But if new build­
ings are but a mask for poor quality in other respects, 
the inclusion of this factor in the quality index may make 
one believe that a school possesses more quality than it 
really does. 
Adjustments and standardization of variables 
As indicated above, some of the variables which compose 
the quality index 5-1 need some sort of adjustment prior to 
being included in that index. One of these is X^ , median 
teachers' salaries, where the adjustment needed may be 
either for the distance between the district and the near­
est PEA center, or for the number of college hours per teach­
ing assignment (Xg), or for a combination of both.^  We can, 
' * 
then, define a new variable, X^  , where D = distance, and 
where 
(5-22) X* =. Xg - b^ D - bjXj 
The coefficients b^  and b^  can be estimated by one of the 
S^ee, however, the Appendix for further comments. 
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regression equations of Table 5-1 or 5-3, or by any other 
such model. Further, since there exists substantial inter-
correlation between and and Xg, and X^ j^  and Xg, 
similar corrections for Xg, X/j. and-Xg may be desirable. 
In addition, X Q^ may be redefined as in one of the 
versions of Tablé 5-11 (or any similar version) to give us 
an adjusted value, X^  ^ , of class size. 
In any event, it would be desirable to standardize 
all of-the variable components of the index so that all 
will be defined in term of some "quality units." A common 
procedure is to subtract the mean and divide by the standard 
deviation so that 
(5-23) 
Xi - Xi 
Si 
where Sj_ is the standard deviation of the variable X^ . 
In sum, after the necessary adjustments and standardi­
zation have been carried through, we are left with a "new" 
index 
(5-24) Q = f(Zp Zg, Z„) 
Description versus optimization 
Model 5-24 can be used for two purposes. First, if 
the nature of f is knovm, one can rank the schools, for 
which the necessary information is available, from the very 
best to the very poorest. This process "is descriptive in 
161 
nature. And while it may be quite interesting, as well as 
of quite great importance in many cases (such as for the 
purpose of advertising a school to a prospective student, 
or for allocating funds to schools whether as a reward for-
excellence or, conversely, as a stimulus for improving 
those with poor quality), still the more challenging aspect 
of 5-24 is its usefullness in enabling the policy-maker to 
choose that set of inputs that will maximize his own ob­
jective function. Moreover, the two functions require 
quite different treatment of 5-24. In the descriptive 
case, a universal rule for f must be developed, against 
which all of the schools must be measured. This implies 
that the definition of quality obtains consensus among all 
school administrators—or at least the majority will agree 
with the particular formulation. On the other hand, one 
can define a different function, f, for each and every 
district", when optimization is our objective. In a sense, 
then, the optimization process need not define a unique 
and unequivocal concept of quality. That may be left to • 
the school board and the individuals who are in the policy­
making position. 
In fact, the analysis of Chapter 3 has clearly shown 
that it is extremely difficult to define quality uniquely 
in terms of either the change in the ITED scores or the 12th 
grade score—if we regard the variables included in 5-1 as 
determining quality. This is perfectly reasonable, since if 
162 
the definition of quality varies from place to place, result­
ing in different utilizations of the factor inputs, no sys­
tematic and clear relationship ought to exist between the 
inputs and the ITED measure. Naturally, it may be that 
quality can be defined uniquely, and that the results of 
Chapter 3 are due, first, to the fact that irregularities 
exist in the handling and administration of, as well as thie 
preparation for the ITED battery, and second, to improper 
specification, namely, that we have omitted a number of 
important variables that would have explained an appreci­
able portion of the variation in the ITED scores (in statis­
tical terms). Also, our exclusive use of the least squares 
estimation procedure (using linear and logarithmic versions) 
may have produced these unfavorable results. Probably a 
number of factors have contributed to the failure of the ITED 
as a good quality index, namely, that we do not have a con­
sensus on the meaning of quality among educators, that some 
important variables are, indeed, missing, and that more 
refined statistical methods may have produced somewhat better 
results. 
Estimation of weights for 5-24 
Returning to the quality index 5-24, the most important 
question that remains to be solved is the estimation of the 
"correct" weights. Suppose» first, that we are merely inter­
ested in the rankings of schools. In that case, we must 
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assume that one, and only one, set of weights applies to"all 
of the schools under Investigation—In other words, we must 
reach a consensus regarding the proper dimensions that 
affect quality. 
A simple solution is the assignment of equal weights to 
the factors, as was done by Hirsch (19). Hirsch contends 
that, first, a doubling of any one weight--for any component-
leaves the rankings unchanged. Second, a subjective evalua­
tion by educators familiar with the schools under considera­
tion proved that in no case did the results of their rankings 
differ appreciably from those which the index produced. Per­
haps a better solution yet will involve the opinions of a 
panel of experts, from whose views and reasoning one could 
approximate the "correct" weights. But when the optimization 
problem is at issue, a detailed analysis of the philosophy, 
opinions and attitudes which prevail in the community should 
be made. On the basis of such analyses, it may be possible 
to obtain reasonably reliable estimates of the appropriate 
weights. 
Summary 
To sum up, our study has Indicated some of the ways by 
which the policy-maker, whether on the national, state, or 
local levels of government, can attempt to answer two impor­
tant questions: (l) On what basis can schools be classified 
Insofar as their (academic) quality is concerned? (2) How 
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shall one proceed to find an optimal allocation of resources' 
in the production of schooling, given a set of constraints 
as well as a specific educational philosophy that will define 
a given objective function? 
Although we have not gone so far as to illustrate the 
mechanics of the mathematical processes involved in answer­
ing these two questions, ample examples abound in the litera­
ture of mathematical programming (particularly linear pro­
gramming) that illustrate the use of such tools in the solu­
tion of problems such as (2) above. In addition, similar 
techniques have already been used in models of optimal re­
source allocation in a university department (l4, 15, 3l), 
and more work is being done on this subject at the time of 
writing. 
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APPENDIX 
Derivation of Formula 2-1 
Define the following variables, as in Chapter 2, 
= costs of producing a human being 
CQ = costs incurred up to the point of birth 
k = annual percentage increase in cost 
Also, define 
d  .  Co . k  
• n = X + 1 
Then, if we have an arithmetic progression with the 
first element = CQ, the total number of elements = n, and 
the difference between the ith and (i + l)st element = d, 
the sum, S, of the progression is 
(A-l) S =  ^[ 2Co + (n-l)d ] 
Substituting the expressions for n and d we get 
(A-2) S = [ 2Cq + xkCg ] 
= Cg [ 1 + X + ] 
A-2 is identical to Equation 2-1 of Chapter 2. 
An Aggregation Problem 
The results of our empirical models have shown that, 
for example, an increase in the median high school teachers' 
salary is associated with an increase in the general level 
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of high school quality, or Yg. However, some caution 
must be exercised in drawing such inferences. In particu­
lar, it may be inferred, from the above result, that if 
one school increases the general salary level there is a 
great likelihood, other things equal, that the quality of 
that school shall increase too. However, it is not nec­
essarily correct to say.that if all Iowa schools raised 
their salary level (by the same margin) that all of the 
schools will, indeed, tend to experience increases in the 
level of school quality. This is, precisely, the aggrega­
tion problem. 
One must note, in this connection, that the effects 
of a general salary increase in one state (say, Iowa), 
are much different from such a raise which takes place 
across the country. Moreover, in either case the short 
run and the long run effects will differ. First, suppose 
that only schools in Iowa raise their salary levels. Then, 
in the short run, one cannot predict any movement of teach­
ers from one school to another (even if the short run encom­
passes more than a year) as a result of the change. Also, 
because it takes a long time to change Jobs and enter new 
occupations, there will be no significantly important move 
from other professions to teaching. At the same time, 
higher salaries may serve as a morale boost, and therefore, 
ceteris paribus, it may contribute to better quality. On 
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the other hand, it is quite likely that such effects will 
be only of minor significance. 
Suppose, now, that a long run analysis is made. If 
one could isolate the effects of a salary change for all 
Iowa schools independently of other changes in the com­
position of all the school inputs (and some changes are 
almost certain to occur), the result should be, it seems, 
an increase in quality. For one thing, if teaching pays 
now relatively more than it did before, marginal students 
may well choose teaching over other subjects, (in Chapter 
2 we have presented Wilkinson's study of enrollment and 
present value changes in* Canada with regard to teaching and 
engineering. These results do support the present argument.) / 
With more qualified teachers available, it is likely that 
the state as a whole could benefit. Second, since it is 
only Iowa (in our example) which raises salaries, there is 
a great likelihood that, if the salary increase is sufficient­
ly large, teachers from other states will compete, for teaching 
positions in Iowa (as has been the case in California, for 
instance). Furthermore, as some qualified educators may 
now be working in higher paying jobs in industry, there is 
some likelihood that a few of them will try to return to edu­
cation as well. In sum, it is not unlikely that as a result 
of a salary increase of a sufficient magnitude, some mobility 
of factors into education will result—which, it appears. 
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will tend to increase the quality of education in Iowa 
schools. 
Consider, next, the case in which not only Iowa"but 
all of the states in the U.S. increase their salary level. 
Then the short run effects will be the same as outlined 
above, in each of the states, while the long run effects 
will be much different. For while there may be (imperfect) 
factor mobility within the United States, insofar as high 
school teaching is concerned, this is not the case for 
international factor movements in this instance. Hence one 
of the factors which may serve to increase quality for one 
state cannot be considered of much import in this context. 
Yet the likelihood that new and old educators may be enticed 
to choose teaching as their profession cannot be ignored, 
and this factor may tend to (slightly) raise the quality of 
education in all of .the United States. (The argument is as 
follows; If more teachers are available than would have 
otherwise been the case, schools have in general a larger 
pool from which they can choose, making it unnecessary, as 
it is today in many communities, to hire people whose 
qualifications are inadequate. Also the greater amount of 
competition for vacant positions will likely result in 
higher standards and better efforts on the part of the edu­
cators who are entering the market.) All in all, while one 
may qualitatively overcome some of the aggregation problems. 
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the quantitative aspects of the problem cannot so be over­
come. That is, the value of the coefficient (of in this 
case) cannot be taken at face value when effects are examined 
for a whole state, region or country. 
Teachers' Salary Schedules and Their Significance 
for "Sampling Fluctuations in Median Salaries 
In practice, the measure of median teacher salary for 
any school (with two or more teachers) will depend on the 
following variables; 
Sg = base salary paid to teachers holding a Bachelor's 
degree and with no teaching experience 
D  = 1 ,  f o r  a  t e a c h e r  h o l d i n g  a  M a s t e r ' s  d e g r e e  
= 0, otherwise 
= years of experience (ranging from 0 to n^ ) 
Eg = years of experience (ranging from n^  to ng) 
H-j_ = 1, if number of semester credits beyond highest 
degree equals to or exceeds 15 
= 0, otherwise 
Ho = 1, if the teacher does not hold a'Bachelor's 
degree 
= Oj otherwise 
Note that years of experience could be divided into many 
groups, but here it is assumed that there are only tvio such 
groupings. Similarly, the variable H can become much more 
nearly continuous, but in practice schools recognize only 
discrete increments in college credits earned by the teachers. 
Using the variables defined above, the salary schedule 
will be based upon the following equation: 
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(A-3) S = 8g(l + dD + "I" ®2^ 2 ~  ^
The lower case letters Indicate the per cent increase (or 
decrease) in the salary of the individual teacher, S, with 
respect to the salary base, 8g, and these are determined 
for each school by its board of education. 
To illustrate the point, we shall examine a specific 
salary schedule for one Iowa school district for the 
academic year 1966-67. The name of the district is with­
held. Now, the vector (d, e^ , e^ , h]^ , h2) for that district 
is equal to (0.10, O.O3, 0.035, O.O3, O.15). Consequently, 
A-3 becomes 
(A-4) S = Sg (1 + O.IOD + 0.03E^  + O.O35E2 
+ 0.03H^  - O.lSHg) 
Also, n^  =6, ng = 15, and Sg = $5,000.00. Table A-1 pre­
sents the full schedule. 
The above model, for the specific schedule, indicates 
that allowance is given for up to 15 years of experience. 
Note, however, that salary increments for the first six 
years of experience are less (per year) than those for the 
remaining nine years. This may be an attempt to keep the 
more experienced teachers within the school, although the 
extra reward is not very large. 
The schedule runs from $4,250 to $8,125. The median 
Table A-l. Salary schedule for teachers in a specific Iowa school district. 
1966-67 
Ne ' B.A. B.A. only B.A. + 15 hrs. M.A. M.A. + 15 hrs. 
f> of % of % of $ % of 3B of Step % $ % $ % % $ % $ 
0 85.0 4,250 100.0 5,000 103.0 5,150 110.0 5,500 113.0 5,650 
1 88.0 4,400 103.0 5,150 106.0 5,300 113.0 5,650 116.0 5,800 
2 91.0 4,550 106.0 5,300 109.0 5,450 116.0 5,800 119.0 5,950 
3 94.0 4,700 109.0 5,450 112.0 5,600 119.0 5,950 122.0 6,100 
4 97.0 4,850 112.0 5,600 115.0 5,750 122.0 6,100 125.0 6,250 
5 100.0 5,000 115.0 5,750 118.0 5,900 125.0 6,250 128.0 6,400 
6 103.0 5,150 118.0 5,900 121.0 6,050 128.0 6,400 131.0 6,550 
7 106.5 5,325 121.5 6,075 124.5 6,225 131.5 6,575 134.5 6,725 
8 110.0 5,500 125.0 6,250 128.0 6,400 135.0 6,750 138.0 6,900 
9 113.5 5,675 128.5 6,425 131.5 6,575 138.5 6,925 141.5 7,075 
10 117.0 5,850 132.0 6,600 135.0 6,750 142.0 7,100 145.0 7,250 
11 120.5 6,025 135.5 6,775 138.5 6,925 145.5 7,275 148.5 7,425 
12 124.0 6,200 139.0 6,950 142.0 7,100 149.0 7,450 152.0 7,600 
13 127.5 6,375 142.5 7,125 145.5 7,275 152.5 7,625 155.5 7,775 
14 131.0 6,550 146.0 7,300 149.0 7,450 156.0 7,800 159.0 7,950 
15 134.5 6,735 149.5 7,475 152.5 7,625 159.5 7,975 162.5 8,125 
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salary of the teachers actually employed in the high school 
could fluctuate substantially from year to year. Many of 
the high schools represented in our 1961-62 data had only 
five to ten teachers. Suppose the salaries in a five 
teacher high school were $5,500, $5,950, $6,400, $7,100 
and $7,800) the median salary would be $6,400. If the 
$7,800 teacher resigned and was replaced by one receiving 
$5,500, the median salary would fall to $5,950. Turnover 
is considerable; thus, the median salaries contain a large 
stochastic element which goes far to explain the rather 
large standard error of estimate associated with our salary 
equations in Chapter 5. 
Data Refinement 
The statistical information upon which the empirical 
content of this study is based was provided, in the main, 
by the Iowa State Department of Public Instruction. Un­
doubtedly, much more information is available within the 
school districts. Also, high school principals could 
collect and keep on file additional statistics that maybe 
useful for models of the type described in this dissertation. 
Specifically, we believe that a number of refinements 
in the data could and should be made, so that models of 
educational policy for high schools could be tested. 
1. We would like some information on the academic 
preparation of the teachers. But college credits alone are 
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not sufficient. Some indication of the quality of those 
credits is important. Stated simply, we may rely upon some 
accreditation agencies that will list colleges of education, 
for example, as "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory." Further, 
the content of the courses for which credits were earned 
seems to be quite important. For example, we would like a 
physics teacher to have a strong background in physics, 
mathematics, and related subjects—not in gymnastics or 
music. In addition, some evidence of personal ability and 
scholastic motivation, such as grades in major and minor 
subjects, in practice (student) teaching, and, perhaps, in 
"methods" courses, is desirable. 
2. The assignments per teacher variable could be re­
fined as well. Ideally, each teacher should be assigned 
entirely within a single major field such as chemistry or 
physics or mathematics, etc.—except to the extent that 
gifted teachgrs of, say, physics also wanted to teach a 
mathematics course now and then for variety. Also, athletic 
coaches should teach nothing but physical education. In 
essence, then, we would supplement the assignments per teach­
er variable with this additional information. 
3. Median teachers' salary reflects, in addition to 
the base salary, the distribution of experience in teaching, 
the size (in terms of ADA) of the district, and the educa­
tional background of the teachers. Evidence on experience— 
inside as well as outside the district—is certainly called 
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for. Further, if salaries are to reflect teachers* pro­
ductivity, some information on teaching effectiveness is 
desirable. This will include such things as enthusiasm 
for teaching, resourcefulness in adapting new materials, 
interest in keeping up with new developments in subject 
matter field, ease and flexibility in relating to people, 
and basic self-confidence and self-esteem. And although 
these are quite difficult to measure, a school principal 
who is interested in the maximigation of the "output" of 
his educational plant should be able to develop rough 
indexes that will reflect the quality of his teachers and 
provide some basis for merit increases in salary. 
4. The variable that measures curriculum breadth—the 
number of credit-units offered—should be supplemented by 
a variable indicating the degree of communication within 
groups such as (a) physical sciences, (b) biological 
sciences, (c.) social sciences, and (d) English and "humani­
ties." In other words, it seems that more sections of the 
same course may contribute to the overall measure of school 
quality, if communication among the teachers of the same 
group actually take places. Consequently, a more detailed 
listing of (a) the number of different units offered and 
(b) the number of sections of each unit is likely to shed 
some additional light on the formulation of quality models 
for high schools. 
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5. A new variable that would indicate the technologi­
cal design of buildings and equipment with respect to both 
instruction and ease of communication among related groups 
of faculty members would be of some interest. In addition, 
the amount and efficiency of secretarial, clerical, supply 
room, "visual aid" and other supporting services to be done 
for the faculty by non-academic personnel may be revealing. 
6. A variable that indicates teaching load is clearly 
missing. Such a variable—one which will measure the 
effective teaching load in terms of hours needed by each . 
teacher for class contact and preparation—will indicate 
the amount of time left over for professional development. 
7. Finally, some information on the socio-economic 
structure of the school district's population would be im-
.portant, including statistics on income, employment, net 
migration, age distribution, and, in particular, the educa­
tional attainment of the adult population. Records of voting 
behavior on school issues might serve as a proxy for some of 
this information; however, an analysis of the effects of 
socio-economic structure on such voting behavior would-be 
needed before such a proxy could be used with confidence. 
